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Abstract 
 
This study reflects on what were the most important motivational factors for the 
Egyptian youth to participate in the 25
th
 of January 2011 revolution. By applying a 
conceptual framework from social movement theory, it attempts to explain what 
paved the way for the Egyptian youth’s participation in the 18 days of protest in 
Tahrir Square. The analysis is based on qualitative interviews conducted with 
Egyptian youth who participated in the revolution, as well as on interviews with area 
specialists. The analysis shows that the youth’s motivation to participate in the 
upheavals was capitalized on a combination of domestic and regional events. While 
the political, economic, and social order described the underlying factors simmering 
in the country, the death of Khaled Said awakened the Egyptian youth and framed 
their grievances. This incident served both as a turning point and a symbol that 
unified them. These factors came to the surface, and the youth dared to take to the 
streets as soon as they saw that the Tunisian people had succeeded in overthrowing 
their own authoritarian regime. The Tunisian revolution served as a model, both by 
demanding the downfall of the autocratic regime the Egyptian people identified with, 
and by demonstrating the possible effects of collective action. For the future of Egypt, 
it seems crucial that not only the government, but also families, learning institutions, 
political parties and religious institutions give young people increasing attention and 
influence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key words: Egypt, revolution, The Arab spring, social movements, motivation, 
political influence, youth influence in the society. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“If you had asked me how old I was after the revolution, I would have answered: I'm 18 days old.  
During the 18 days in Tahrir Square I felt that I was totally a human being. Everyone accepted me, 
everyone trusted me, and everyone talked with me. And I did the same thing with them. It was 18 days 
of utopia, and it changed many people. We must go back to the way we were during those 18 days in 
order to build up our country again” (“Anwar” 2012 interview).  
 
On the 25
th
 of January 2011, an uprising erupted in Egypt, which captivated the world. 
The Egyptian people managed to overthrow its authoritarian president, Hosni 
Mubarak, who had been ruling Egypt for nearly 30 years. Several attempts had been 
made in the past to gather support for change in Egypt (El Mahdi 2012; Khalil 2012). 
Local protests and strikes had been carried out for years by educated youth and 
workers in Egypt to call attention to high unemployment, low wages, police 
harassment, and state corruption (Goldstone 2011: 337; El Mahdi 2012; Khalil 2012; 
Shehata 2012).  
 
As the protest movements in Egypt had been small and ineffective, the regime 
officials took measures to increase their own wealth at the expense of the people’s 
suffering (Al Aswaany 2011: viii). By controlling elections and political parties and 
using subsidies for goods to pay off their citizens, autocratic regimes, such as in 
Egypt during the regime of Mubarak, manage to keep the masses depoliticized and 
unorganized (Angrist 2011; Cook 2009; Goldstone 2011). Furthermore, the Mubarak 
regime ensured that the population remained disconnected and passive by using media 
control, surveillance, and intimidation (Goldstone 2011: 331).   
 
Before the revolution, research on Egyptian youth focused mainly on the youth bulge 
that causes many problems in the Egyptian society (Muñoz 2000; Meijer 2000; 
UNDP 2010; Herrera 2010). At the same time as alienation was growing among the 
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young people, there was a decline in their chances to integrate socially, politically and 
economically (Meijer 2000:1). However, the 18 days of protest proved that youth has 
the ability to claim their own rights. The youth who were usually regarded as 
incapable of change were addressed as those who had brought about this uprising (Al 
Aswaany 2011; Khalil 2012; Shahine 2011). By enforcing their own political 
participation and demanding different rights, the Egyptian youth presented a new 
challenge in terms of being included in national strategies for change. During the 18 
days of the uprising, the youth changed the dominant image of young people from 
being the problem into being the hope of the country (Shahine 2011). The way the 
youth had managed to mobilize and bring about change had for many been 
unthinkable, and even fewer had imagined that the Egyptian people could oust an 
autocrat in only 18 days (ibid.). This thesis thus asks: What were the most important 
motivational factors for the Egyptian youth to participate in the 25
th
 of January 2011 
revolution? 
 
In order to understand what motivated the Egyptian youth to participate in the protests 
in Tahrir Square, it is essential to understand the factors behind their motivation. I 
propose three direct hypotheses to answer the research question. Firstly, the Egyptian 
youth wanted to protest against the political, economic and social order. Secondly, the 
youth were motivated by the upheavals in Tunisia. Thirdly, the youth were motivated 
by the issues and circumstances around the killing of Khaled Said.  
 
In this study, the research question is addressed through these hypotheses in the form 
of a case study by using a qualitative approach. The political contention in Egypt laid 
the basis for a social movement, which gave way to a revolution (Zohar 2011). By 
applying a conceptual framework from social movement theory, specifically framing 
consensus and mobilization, political opportunity structures, and street politics, this 
study attempts to explain what paved the way for the Egyptian youth’s participation in 
the 18 days of protest in Tahrir Square.  
 
 3 
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 provides a background for the social and 
political conditions of the Egyptian youth during the regime of Mubarak. Chapter 3 
defines social movement, contentious politics, and street politics, how these terms can 
be understood in the political and cultural context in Egypt, and why they are used. 
The chapter also points out the contested concept of the term revolution, and explains 
why the uprising in Egypt can be called a revolution. Furthermore, the three 
hypotheses are presented.  Chapter 4 presents the method and research design applied 
in this study. In Chapter 5, each of the hypotheses is examined systematically, before 
being discussed and analyzed. In addition, throughout this chapter the findings are 
connected to the theory in chapter 3. Finally, Chapter 6 provides some conclusions 
that are drawn from the analysis, and presents some methodological remarks. 
Additionally, I suggest a number of theoretical implications regarding youth as a 
category, and political implications concerning the situation of the Egyptian youth.   
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Chapter 2: 
The social, political and economic 
conditions of youth before the uprising 
 
Egyptians are like camels: they can put up with the beatings, 
humiliation, and starvation for a long time but when they rebel  
they do so suddenly and with a force that is impossible to control.
1
 – Alaa Al Aswany 
 
2.1 Nepotism and corruption  
Although there have been several protests in Egypt before (Bush & Ayeb 2012), 
many have wondered why Egyptians waited so long to rebel, when all the conditions 
in the country were screaming for a revolution. According to Huntington, Revolutions 
are “more likely to occur in societies which have experienced some social and 
economic development and where the process of political modernization and political 
development has lagged behind the process of social and economic change” 
(Goldstone 1993:39). Egypt serves as such an example. 
 
For thirty years Hosni Mubarak had monopolized power through rigged elections, and 
the Egyptian people feared that he was trying to install his son, Gamal Mubarak, as 
his successor (Bush & Ayeb 2012:7; Shenker 2009; Brown et al. 2007; Souare 2008; 
El Mahdi & Marfleet 2009). Although there had been clear attempts to strengthening 
“civil society” activities, the different state agents continued to repress the economic 
claims of the Egyptian people “in the pursuit of brutal privatization and speculative 
projects of oligarchic economic restructuring” (Singerman et al. 2006: 5). The 
government minimized its role as a welfare state and encouraged investments in the 
market, which led to the appearance of new forms of negotiating and contesting social 
structures. Changes in class structures widened the gap between classes, regions and 
                                                         
1
 Al Aswaany, Alaa (2011: viii) 
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social groups with rising poverty and unemployment. Not only did this lead to the 
increasing of elite communities around the city, the poor urban neighborhood and 
slum areas grew also (Denis 2006). 
 
The existence of nepotism could also be found in the society. It has been reported that 
there have been unclear rules regarding the selection process of public officials, and 
that the public sector employees’ children were prioritized, regardless of their 
qualifications (Transparency International 2009a). Further, favoritism and informal 
relationships have also affected the implementation of judicial decisions (Global 
Integrity Report 2010). Nepotism has been rife as well as the development discourse 
in the country. It became widely accepted as a “fact of life” (Transparency 
International 2009b), which shows how nepotism has infiltrated the society.  
 
The level of corruption was pervasive at all levels of government and viewed as 
unprecedented in the history of Egypt (Al Aswaany 2011; Freedom House 2010). In 
addition, the political system in Egypt was designed to ensure that the ruling National 
Democratic Party had the solid majorities at all levels of government (Freedom House 
2010). Al Aswaany (2011) uses the concepts of nepotism and corruption to describe 
the order of things in Egypt. Corruption took many forms in order to get things done, 
where one of them was bribery in different public sectors, such as police, customs and 
education (Al Aswaany 2011: vii; Anderson 2011). Although there were legal 
regulations that governed bribery offered to civil servants, they were not effective in 
practice. Illegal acts made by civil servants were – and still are – a common practice 
in the Egyptian public services. Civil servants would accept gifts, hospitality and 
facilitation payments, and in return they speeded up the governmental action 
processes (U4 2012:6, Transparency International 2010, Freedom House 2011).  
 
2.2 Civil liberties and previous movements 
The Emergency Law in Egypt, which has existed since 1958, gave security officials 
the right to prohibit or disperse rallies that were election-related, demonstrations, and 
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public meetings. People also risked being detained indefinitely without charge. The 
authorities used these powers before the parliamentary elections in 2010 by 
preventing gatherings and arresting individuals exclusively for exercising their rights 
to freedom of association, assembly, and expression (Human Rights Watch 2010). 
Independent media outlets were closed down, security officers targeted bloggers, and 
journalists who criticized government policies were subjected to attacks, police 
harassment and imprisonment (Human Rights Watch 2011, Freedom House 2010, 
Transparency International 2010). Civil society was constrained, and a combination 
of legal restrictions, insecure political contexts and a lack of organizations resulted in 
little public debate. Thus, the civil society’s opportunities to influence public policies 
were few (U4 2012: 4). Nevertheless, Egypt has a long tradition of court systems and 
institutions (Sherif 1998).   
 
As neoliberal economic strategies were introduced in the country, many sectors were 
privatized. This led to a series of protest in Egypt, especially since 2004 (Bush & 
Ayeb 2012; El Mahdi 2012; Khalil 2012). Many felt an uncertainty concerning their 
life conditions with the attempts of privatizing industry, energy, water, health, 
education, etc. (Clement 2009).  Thus, the rise in prices, wage reductions, and the fear 
of getting fired led many to protests.  
 
In December 2004, Kefaya,
2
 an informal movement, held the first demonstration that 
explicitly called for Mubarak to step down. The movement mobilized the Judges’ 
syndicate, which was the only union that was free of government control (El Mahdi 
2009: 1034).  The regime responded heavy-handedly and Ayman Nour, who was the 
leader of the movement, was arrested and charged for election fraud, and therefore 
sentenced to five years in prison (Farag 2006, MacLeod 2009). Certain political 
movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, were excluded from the political 
alliance, and Kefaya did not succeed in including the wider Egyptian population. This 
allowed the Mubarak regime to appoint the smaller political parties and weaken the 
movement for change (El Mahdi 2009: 1030, Khalil 2012: 45). However, the 
                                                         
2 Kefaya means ’enough’ in Arabic. 
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movement set the stage for future events and changed the game in a crucial and 
permanent way by shattering “the mystique around the Mubarak name” (Khalil 2012: 
45-46).  
 
The workers’ strikes were other instances that involved cooperation between large 
groups in the society. The strikes raged throughout the country in 2006, 2007 and 
2008, and were led by the textile workers in Mahalla al-Kubra. All of the participants 
fought for a higher minimum wage, health benefits and job security (Morrow & 
Omrani 2007). Thousands of students, unemployed and textile workers from Mahalla 
al-Kubra gathered on April 6, 2008 to protest against high food prices, unemployment 
and police brutality (Ciezadlo 2011: 233). This protest led to the creation of the April 
6 Movement
3, and emerged out of a need to support the workers’ movement in 2008 
(Khalil 2012: 51). A group of young activists used social networks to publish the 
workers’ demands, and promote national solidarity by holding a national strike (Jilo 
2011). Although the workers managed to create unity within the factories, they had 
still been unable to reach the political arena. Even though movements like Kefaya had 
managed to break political barriers, they had failed to develop into more than a 
middle-class phenomenon. The strikes managed to combine Egypt’s political and 
democratic grievances with the economic grievances (Khalil 2012: 54).  
 
Things were consistently simmering throughout the first decade of the twenty-first 
century. NGOs were leaping and the number of online activists multiplied. The 
apparatus around Mubarak was getting weaker, and “the societal forces arrayed 
against him grew stronger” (Khalil 2012: 55). However, among the larger and non-
politicized groups in the society, desperation and helplessness was growing (ibid.).  
 
                                                         
3 The April 6 Movement also held a small protest on January 25, 2010 against police brutality and the 
Interior Ministry. This day was chosen because it was Police Day, a national holiday that 
commemorates the 1952 struggle of the Ismailia police force against the occupying British. The protest 
was violently broken up and dozens were arrested, which is the reason why the April 6 Movement 
wanted to hold a similar demonstration the following year.  
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2.3 The exclusion of youth in Egypt  
Like many other countries in the Middle East, Egypt has been going through a so-
called “youth bulge”, a period where the numbers of youths 4  have increased 
significantly in comparison to other groups in the population (Assaad &Barsoum 
2007: 8). According to Assaad and Barsoum (2007), it is a multidimensional process 
to understand why youth is being excluded, such as in education, work opportunities, 
potentials for forming families and civic participation. They all represent important 
stages in life pivotal for “including youths in society” (ibid.).  
 
In Egypt, youths continue being among the most disadvantaged groups. They suffer 
from higher rates of unemployment, lower earnings, and have both limited job 
security and instability (Asaad & Barsoum 2007: 5). Herrera argues that “youth 
themselves are rarely consulted about their struggles for a lifestyle and livelihood or 
about the type of citizens they are or aspire to be” (Herrera 2010: 127). The exclusion 
of youth in Egypt has led to “waithood” (UNDP 2010: 3), where the young people are 
simply waiting for their lives to begin, because of long periods of unemployment, 
which forces them to live with their parents and makes them financially unable to get 
married. According to Roudi-Fahimi et al. (2011), 90 percent of the unemployed in 
Egypt are youth, whereas the situation is especially difficult for unemployed young 
women. In Egypt, the gender gap is among the highest in the world
5
 (UNDP 2010:94). 
There are few opportunities for young women to participate in public life. In a survey 
conducted by the Population Council among youth in Egypt, more than 40 percent of 
the youth thought personal connections were more important than personal skills in 
securing a job (Population Council 2009: 101). This reflects the widespread 
corruption prevailing in the society.   
 
There are a number of factors highlighting the absence of youth participation in the 
social, political and economic environment. The family is the primary source of 
financial security. It defines political membership and offers networking to crucial 
                                                         
4 Like Jeffrey (2010), I apply the term ’youth’ to refer to people between 16 and 30 years old. 
5 Egypt ranks 120 out of 128 countries in terms of gender gap, and has one of the lowest female labor 
participation rates in the world (UNDP 2010).  
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political resources, and religious identity (Joseph 1996: 15). In both Egypt and other 
Arab countries, the authoritarian hierarchy that has originated in the family (Krauss 
1987) is controlled and dominated by men. The hierarchical structure does not only 
have to do with the difference between the genders, that the women are assigned a 
subordinate status. The families are stratified on the basis of both gender and age, 
where the young are subordinate to the old and the females to males (Barakat 1993: 
102).  
 
Social conditioning by the family, the legal systems, and the market create the roles to 
be played by both boys and girls in their society. In addition, they define their 
interaction in both public and private spheres (UNDP 2010: 94). Furthermore, in 
young people, there is a predominance of the culture of fear. Parents warn their 
children not to engage in any political activity, especially if it is in opposition to the 
regime (UNDP 2010: 65). Instead of being encouraged to express their own opinions, 
the youth are controlled in the framework of a hierarchical system that undermines 
their abilities, and prevents them from independent thinking and decision-making 
(UNDP 2010: 95). These factors also help to explain some of the negative trends in 
community values that prevail among young people. Intolerance to others’ opinions, 
absence of a sense of belonging, individualism, selfishness and passiveness, are some 
examples (UNDP 2010: 221).  
 
The educational system in Egypt is a further negative factor. Elementary education is 
compulsory in Egypt, and around 90 per cent of all school-age children were enrolled 
in the country’s pre-university education system in 2008. However, the system as a 
whole is in trouble because of falling enrolments, poor teacher-student ratios and 
persistent gender inequality (Osman 2011: 222). The most dissatisfied are the young 
people who have received an education or academic training. Not only do they 
usually have a higher education and greater expectations than their parents, they also 
live under the same regime since their birth (Filiu 2011: 35, Muñoz 2000: 23).   
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Chapter 3: Theory  
 
The first section of this theoretical chapter defines terms like social movement, 
revolution, contentious politics, and street politics. Further, an attempt has been made 
to explain how these terms can be understood in the political and cultural context in 
Egypt and why they are used. After this background section, I explain why youths’ 
motivation to participate in the protests is chosen. Finally, three hypotheses are 
presented in order to explain which factors that may have motivated the Egyptian 
youth to participate in the protests in Tahrir Square: a protest against the political, 
economic and social order, the upheavals in Tunisia, and the issues and circumstances 
around the killing of Khaled Said.  
 
3.1 Social movement as political struggle 
Scholars argue that social movements are distinct social processes (Diani 1992; 2003; 
2004; Diani & Bison 2004). These processes consist of mechanisms where 
individuals engage in collective action, which serves as the basis of social movements. 
To this end, the individuals in social movements are engaged in political conflicts that 
are “meant to promote or oppose social change” (della Porta & Diani 2006: 21), 
where the opponents are clearly identified. Collective action is often the only resource 
ordinary people possess to demonstrate their claims against their opponents (Tarrow 
2011: 7). The actors are linked by informal networks and are in pursuit of common 
goals, while at the same time maintaining their autonomy and independence. They 
share a distinct collective identity, which is strongly associated with recognition of the 
creation of connectedness (Pizzorno 1996). The actors have a sense of common 
purpose and shared commitment to a cause. This enables activists to feel compatible 
and linked to other actors without having to be identical (della Porta & Diani 2006: 
21). The people who participated in Tahrir Square were not identical. They were from 
different social classes, generations and genders.  However, they had a common 
purpose and stood together under the slogan “bread, dignity and justice” (Naguib 
2011; Henry & Springborg 2011: 136; Awad 2011: 128).  
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Following Tarrow (2011), this study focuses on the upheavals in Egypt as driven by 
social movements. Social movements are long-lasting and more or less structured 
collective actions based on common purpose and social solidarities, in sustained 
interaction with elites, opponents and authorities, where the goal is social change 
(Tarrow 2011: 9; Bayat 1997:7). While the original social movements were often 
generated or mobilized by clearly charismatic leaders, new social movements are self-
generating and hold a vague or nonexistent leadership, underscoring identity and 
content (Bayat 1997:7). Through collective identity building, individual actors 
involved in collective action no longer pursue specific goals. Rather, they regard 
themselves as elements of larger processes of change (della Porta & Diani 2006:22). 
However, one can only call it a social movement when single episodes of collective 
action are viewed as components of a longer-lasting action, and when the engaged 
actors are aware of their actions by articulating their aims, methods and justifications 
(Bayat 1997: 7, della Porta & Diani 2006: 23). Once the actors recognize they have a 
common purpose and the fact that they are linked by ties of solidarity, the potential 
for a movement into action increases (della Porta & Diani 2006).  
 
Social movements are seldom under the control of a single leader or organization 
(Bayat 1997:7). Rather, it is the changes in public political opportunities and 
constraints that create the most important incentives for triggering new phases of 
contention for people with collective claims (Tarrow 2011: 12). Bohn (2011) argues 
that there was no specific leader or organization that planned the protests in Egypt: 
“the people led this revolution automatically, without anyone saying anything.” (Bohn 
2011: 76). Bayat also argues, “Although revolutionaries might have engaged in 
plotting and preparing, they do not necessarily result from prior schemes.” (Bayat 
2010: 2).  Further, it is doubtful that revolutions and social movements can ever be 
planned, as they are never predictable (Bayat 2010: 2; 2007: 200-201). Also, the 
political context is not only relevant to patterns of social movements. Its impact on 
resource level, external structuring theory, the development of the target and action 
repertoire has proven to be both pervasive and systematic (Kriesi 1996: 104). 
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3.2 The Egyptian uprising 2011 
Revolution is a contested concept in the field of political science (See Goldstone 
2001). Defining it constitutes a challenge, since the definition of revolution has 
changed as new events have come forth on the stage of world history. The term is also 
a contested concept between revolutionary actors, on the one hand, and theorists on 
the other (Farr 1982: 688). Skocpol (1979:4) defines revolutions as “rapid, basic 
transformations of society’s state and class structures … accompanied and in part 
carried through by class-based revolts from below”. Skocpol’s definition does not 
include matters such as revolutionary ideologies, bases for revolutionary mobilization, 
and the possibility for multiclass coalitions, as these where not seen as central features 
for revolutions (Goldstone 2001: 140). By contrast, McCaughrin (1976) is interested 
in the changing properties of revolutions, anticipating both new causes of revolution 
as well as a new concept of revolution. He foresaw transformations in the means, aim, 
focus and scope, implying that the concept would also include upheavals that are less 
violent, and less predicated upon society-wide mobilization (McCaughrin 1976: 643).  
 
The world has witnessed many revolutions that have challenged the class-based 
understandings of revolutions (Goldstone 2001: 141). Skocpol’s rather simple state- 
and class-based conception of revolutions is therefore no longer adequate. In order to 
include events ranging from the relatively peaceful revolutions that have overthrown 
communist regimes to violent Islamic revolutions, Goldstone (2001: 142) provide a 
broader definition of revolution: “an effort to transform the political institutions and 
the justifications for political authority in a society, accompanied by formal and 
informal mass mobilization and noninstitutionalized actions that undermine existing 
authorities”. DeFronzo (1996:10) has a similar definition, but emphasizes that 
politically savvy dissident elites guiding the revolution are critical for a revolution to 
come about.  
 
Scholars discuss whether the uprising in Egypt can be regarded as a revolution, and 
whether the removal of Hosni Mubarak can be treated as a successful revolution 
(Hasan 2011). However, this study argues that one should rather see revolutionary 
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movements as split into fractions, with the ousting of the existing regime as their sole 
common objective (Haass 2011: 117; Tarrow 2011: 159). Even though Mubarak’s 
departure was a significant development that terminated a prolonged era of Egyptian 
politics, it was not decisive. Rather, it marked the end of the first phase of the 
Egyptian revolution, with the struggle for Egypt’s future waiting ahead (Haass 2011: 
116). Furthermore, the revolution should be seen as a process, and not only as an 
event (Goldstone 2011: 340; Soueif 2011; Stites 1978). According to Alexander 
(2011: x), it is awareness, whether it is internal, subjective or collective, that causes 
revolutionary movements to progress. During the violent clashes in Tahrir Square on 
28
th
 of January, a journalist from Al Jazeera, in a television reporting in Arabic, 
described the awareness that was reflected in the street (Al-Bushra 2011).  Following 
the broad definition of revolution that Goldstone (2001: 142) provide, the upheavals 
in Egypt should be called a revolution, as ordinary people made an effort to transform 
the justifications for the political authority in the country through mass mobilization 
that undermined the existing authority. Additionally, the informants interviewed for 
this study applied the term ‘revolution’ (Thawra)6.  
 
3.3 Contentious politics  
There is a peculiar interrelationship between political opportunities, contentious 
politics and social movements. According to Tarrow (2011: 6), contentious politics 
occur “when ordinary people join forces in confrontation with elites, authorities, and 
opponents” around their claims. When participants perceive and respond to changes 
in political opportunities and threats, contentious politics emerges, and the way will 
be paved for challenging the status quo (Tarrow 2011: 16). However, people do not 
run the risks and pay the costs of engaging in contentious politics unless they have a 
good reason to do so (Tarrow 2011: 11). Not only do the people need to have a 
common purpose, they also need to recognize their common interest, which increases 
the potential for putting a movement into action (ibid.).  
 
                                                         
6 Thawra means ’revolution’ in Arabic and was frequently used by my informants during the 
interviews. 
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3.3.1 Framing 
Framing is a process where states of affairs are interpreted, defined and redefined 
jointly by social actors, media, and members of society (Tarrow 2011: 144). By 
framing contentious politics, movements reflect, capture, and shape emotions to 
mobilize followers, and thus construct collective identities (Tarrow 2011: 143). 
According to Tarrow (2011), people revolt when a target for grievance is identified 
and empowered by a sense of injustice. By embedding specific grievances in framings 
that are emotional-laden, movements are capable of convincing participants that their 
cause is just and important (Tarrow 2011: 26).  
 
According to McAdam (1999:51), people must collectively define their situation as 
unjust before collective action can get underway. However, it is not easy to convince 
people who are normally passive that the “indignities and inequalities of everyday life 
can be challenged” (Tarrow 2011. 145). By inscribing in frames that identify an 
injustice, the responsibility for it is attributed to others (Tarrow 2011: 145). Through 
collective action, the social condition that was previously seen as unfortunate yet 
tolerable can be redefined as unjust and immoral (Snow & Benford 1992: 137). 
However, the possibility to participate in a collective action that might be both risky 
and beneficial may in itself be an incentive for people whose lives are stuck in toil 
and desperation (Tarrow 2011: 29).  
 
3.3.2 Political Opportunities and Threats 
According to Goldstone and Tilly (2001:182), opportunities are the perceived 
probability that social protest actions will lead to success in achieving a desired 
outcome. Opportunities are increased when changes occur in the balance of political 
and economic resources between a state and its challengers “that shift domestic or 
outside support away from the regime” (Goldstone & Tilly 2001: 182-183).  
 
Threats are not directly related to the prospects of success. Rather, it relates to the 
risks and costs of action or inaction (Tarrow 2011: 160). Goldstone and Tilly 
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(2001:183) argue that “ a group may decide to bear very high costs for protest if it 
believes the chances of success are high, but the same group may decide to avoid 
even modest costs of protest if it believes the chances of succeeding are low”. 
However, it is not the shifts in the prospects of success alone that shapes decisions 
regarding collective action, but “how threats and opportunities combine” (Tarrow 
2011: 161). When ordinary citizens experience threats and perceive opportunities, 
when potential allies are revealed, the vulnerability of opponents is exposed, and 
collective identities are triggered into action around common themes, then contentious 
politics is produced (Tarrow 2011: 33, 160).  
 
3.3.3 Making Opportunities    
The challengers do not necessarily need to understand the political opportunity 
structures to seize the moment and start a process of change. According to Tarrow 
(2011), challengers with mobilization capacity, resources and strong dissatisfaction 
pave the way for those with fewer resources and less capacity. The “early risers” 
(Tarrow 2011: 167) reveal their opponent’s vulnerability and expose them to attack 
from weaker players by challenging the authorities. This expresses why the social 
movement that developed into a revolution in Egypt started with young people from 
the middle-class and not with the general public. An essential factor when mobilizing 
the people to join the demonstration was the shrinking middle-class (Ez-Eldin 2011; 
Shahine 2011; Henry & Springborg 2011). Not only did the revolution manage to 
mobilize the middle-class to seek freedom and jobs, it also energized the poor who 
joined in the protests a few days later to demand bread, dignity and justice (Henry & 
Springborg 2011: 136, Naguib 2011).  
 
Contentious politics creates new opportunities for others. Not only does it construct 
and develop requirements, it also lays the basis for political mobilization: “The 
opening opportunities provide external resources to people who lack internal ones; 
openings where there were only walls before; alliances that did not previously seem 
possible; and realignments that appear capable of bringing new groups to power” 
(Tarrow 1998: 89). Although this movement started with the middle-class (Ez-Eldin 
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2011; Shahine 2011; Henry & Springborg 2011), the struggle developed in a 
discourse that appealed to everyone in Egypt, regardless of their ideological positions 
(Balata 2011: 64; Gause 2011: 207). Furthermore, political opportunities must be seen 
as product of a given environment, not as being owned by any particular side (Rucht 
1996: 185). According to Balata (2011), there are two reasons why cooperation and 
mass mobilization succeeded in Egypt. Firstly, there was no single political party or 
group taking ownership of the demonstration on 25
th
 of January or the subsequent 
protests. Secondly, they learned from their past attempts of cooperation across groups 
and their long history of oppression that it would be more profitable to abandon any 
political and ideological differences, and instead concentrate on their common 
interests – to bring about a political and economic change in the country (Balata 2011: 
69).  
 
Contentious politics arises where there is a potential for space to open up as a result of 
political and economic repression, social inequalities, and an increasing injustice 
(Tarrow 2011). The informants told how the Egyptian youth were desperately seeking 
higher living standards, and the potential for change soon resonated when they 
witnessed the former Tunisian president Ben Ali being forced to leave his throne, 
which will be discussed in greater detail in the analysis chapter. At this period of time, 
there had been several processes of political deliberalization characterized by 
economic inflation, intensified conflict, including a tension around the upcoming 
presidential elections (Shehata 2011). The concern that Gamal Mubarak would take 
over the presidency (Bush & Ayeb 2012; Shenker 2009; Brown et al. 2007; Souare 
2008; El Mahdi & Marfleet 2009), as well as numerous other factors and incidents, 
caused the youth to see the necessity of change. Therefore, one can say that both 
domestic factors and political opportunities lead to the existence of contentious 
politics in Egypt (Balata 2011: 65).  
 
3.4 Street politics  
Bayat (1997) has constructed a theory of informal politics, which he calls Street 
Politics. Bayat defines ‘Street Politics’ as a set of conflict between a populace and the 
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authorities created and expressed in the streets. Here, the street serves as a place 
where those lacking institutional settings to express discontent, can express 
themselves collectively. Among the people belonging to this group, are the young and 
unemployed (Bayat 1997: 15). The clusters consist of different actors without 
institutions, ideology and evident leadership.  
 
According to Bayat (1997), there are two key factors that transform the street into an 
arena of politics. Firstly, the use of public space is seen as a contestation between the 
populace and the authority. The state expects their users to operate passively to rules 
by the state. Secondly, any collective political mobilization requires the actors to 
organize, communicate and – to a certain degree – do networking, either formally or 
informally. The street is a public place that makes it possible for people mobilize 
through passive networks. Here, the individuals can communicate instantaneously and 
recognize their common identity, which is mediated through space, and they can 
engage themselves, often instantly, in collective action without the help of active 
networks and organizations (Bayat 1997: 16-19).  
 
During the Mubarak regime, unauthorized political demonstrations were illegal. 
Although the state may have been able to restrict deliberately organized 
demonstrations, it was incapable of prohibiting the people to use  the physical and 
social space of the street. As Bayat (1997: 19) states: “The more open and visible the 
public place, the broader the operation of passive networks and therefore the 
possibility of collective action becomes”. Tahrir Square, The Liberation Square, being 
both an open and visible public place, became both the primary destination for the 
protesters in Cairo, as well as serving as a political arena for the Egyptian people. 
This was a place where the people could act collectively to win back their ability to 
exert influence against state oppression and the suppression of the will of the people 
(Atassi 2011: 32).  
 
When a large number of people act collectively, it has a normalizing and legitimizing 
effect on the acts that would otherwise be deemed illegitimate (Bayat 2010: 20). Thus, 
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the larger the number of protesters asserting their presence in the public space, such as 
Tahrir Square, the more the Mubarak regime will be undermined. Although this was a 
leaderless revolution consisting of people acting individually and separately, it does 
not mean that the effects of their actions faded away. Rather, they may have generated 
“a more powerful dynamic than their individual sum total” (ibid.).  
 
3.5 Exploring the youth’s motivation to participate  
When the general public talks about the revolution in Egypt and the different factors 
leading to the upheavals, they have mainly focused on the Egyptian people as a whole. 
However, it is important to differentiate between groups within the Egyptian people, 
since the Arab society is in the throes of a generational conflict (Muñoz 2000), where 
politics is controlled by the older generation (Osman 2011: 223;Ibrahim & Wassed 
2000; UNDP 2010;). Another important reason for studying youth is the absence of 
youth as a social category in the various social movement debates (Bayat 2010: 116). 
Although some scholars have been focusing on youth in the Middle East since the 
1990s, their perspective has largely been on the labor market (Muñoz 2000; Meijer 
2000; UNDP 2010; Herrera 2010). The study of youth as political actors, however, 
has been almost non-existent (Bayat 2011a.). In accordance with Jeffrey (2010), this 
study defines the term “youth” as people between 16 and 30 years old. 
 
Egypt is, like many countries in the Middle East, in the midst of a growing birthrate 
bulge. More than one-third of the population is between 15 and 29 (Shehata 2011: 
140). According to the World Bank, the Middle East has, on the one hand, the fastest-
rising levels of schooling and, on the other, the highest level of youth unemployment 
in the world (World Bank 2011). The youth in Egypt have been denied outlets for 
political and civic participation because of constraints on the political life and civil 
society (Shehata 2011: 141), where over fifty percent are poor (Egypt Independent 
2012). The fact that there are clear and deep-rooted generational differences in the 
Egyptian society makes it interesting to take a closer look at the youth, in order to find 
out which factors motivated them to participate in the protests in Tahrir Square.  
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There are many factors that may have motivated the youth to participate in the 
upheavals. However, based on my literature review and fieldwork, there are three 
possible approaches that may offer a direct and broad explanation for the Egyptian 
youth’s motivation to take part in the protests. I want to explore these approaches, and 
have therefore made three hypotheses: 
 
H1: The youth wanted to protest against the political, economic and social order. 
H2: The youth were motivated by the upheavals in Tunisia. 
H3: The youth were motivated by the issues and circumstances around the killings of 
Khaled Said.  
 
3.5.1 The political, economic and social order 
Both women and men who were interviewed for this thesis spoke about the social 
order in their society. Hierarchical structures are deeply rooted in Egypt, and affect all 
parts of the society. In the family, the hierarchical structure is based on gender and 
age, and requires the young to obey the old and fulfill their expectations (Barakat 
1993: 106). The lack of jobs makes it difficult for young men to save money to buy 
their own apartments, which means that they need to live at home with their parents. 
Thus, young people are socialized into dependence and escapism (Barakat 1993: 105), 
and live in a state of “permanent infantilized arrested development” (Khalil 2012: 58-
59).  45 million young Egyptians are under thirty-five years of age, including the 
largest group of adolescents in the country’s history (Osman 2011: 213; Shehata 
2011: 141). While accounting for a large proportion of the population, the 
unemployed youth are also most affected by social exclusion (Muñoz 2000: 21). Even 
though they may be both trained and qualified for a job, they are compelled to 
prolonged unemployment, living with their parents and postponing both adulthood 
and wedding plans (Filiu 2011: 35). 
 
The young feel insecure in almost all aspects of life. They are hardly free to make 
their own decisions. Any meaningful social participation is looked upon with disfavor 
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because of their sociopolitical environments (UNDP 2010; Assaad & Barsoum 2007). 
Not only does the abuse of their rights drive the Egyptian youth to reject the 
governing regime, it also causes them to reject the entire society because they feel 
imprisoned and humiliated (UNDP 2009). The young people feel let down and 
marginalized by their society, and do not identify with the political thinking and 
behavior of their elders (Muñoz 2000: 23). The young generation’s contribution to 
public policy has not been welcomed in decision-making circles (Osman 2011: 223). 
Furthermore, significant fractions of the Egyptian youth have resented the 
paternalistic tone employed by president Hosni Mubarak for nearly 30 years (Stacher 
2011: 102, Filiu 2011: 35). In addition, youth have been addressed as a group that 
needs both guidance and deviation from the national discourse (Ibrahim & Wassed 
2000: 162). Therefore the young people feel like outsiders in their own country (Filiu 
2011: 35).  
 
3.5.2 The upheavals in Tunisia 
Angrist (2011) writes about how under dictatorships, people act as if they were 
content with the status quo. They do so because they fear the wrath of the security 
system. However, when the cost of pretending the status quo to be acceptable 
becomes intolerable for some of the citizens, sudden and surprising mass protests can 
erupt. This will again trigger similar actions by others, who will decide to join the 
opposition when witnessing the great number of others who feel as they do and are 
willing to show it publicly (Angrist 2011: 77).   
 
The Jasmine Revolution
7
 in Tunisia in mid-January 2011 had an important impact on 
the outbreak of protests in Egypt. It demonstrated to the Egyptian people that even a 
police state such as Tunisia can accomplish political change through a public and 
peaceful mass movement (Shehata 2011: 138, Khalil 2012: 123). The unacceptable 
realities of the Egyptian people re-politicized the population who had been politically 
desensitized (Khalil 2012: 123).  
                                                         
7
 The name ”Jasmine Revolution” originated from the Tunisian Journalist Zied El-Heni, it is named 
after Tunisia’s national flower and in keeping with the geopolitical nomenclature of “color revolutions”.  
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The revolution in Tunisia gave the Egyptian youth the courage and belief they needed 
to think that they too could bring about change in Egypt (Ghonim 2012: 131). The 
youth activists tried to re-think their former demonstrations and learn from past 
experiences (El Mahdi 2012; Balata 2012). Several attempts had been made in Egypt 
in the past to rally support for change (Khalil 2012). However, the activists’ repeated 
defeats in the past when confronted with the brutality of Mubarak’s regime, and their 
constant trying and failing, made them want to try something totally new (Filiu 2011: 
38, Bohn 2011: 76).  Although social networks were used as tools to mobilize the 
Egyptian people, several activists went into the streets and walked in them in order to 
gather people and increase their numbers before the rally in Tahrir Square (Bohn 
2011: 76; Khalil 2012: 144). 
 
3.5.3 The issues and circumstances around the killings of Khaled 
Said 
On June 6, 2010, Khaled Said, a 28-year old, was brutally murdered by state security 
forces outside a café in Alexandria. Images of Said’s face started circulating, and 
earned severe condemnation from the Egyptian free media and the civilians (Khalil 
2012: 75-77). This incident caused the discussions about police brutality to resurface 
among the youths in Egypt (Khalil 2012: 79-81). Widespread demonstrations took 
place, and at least 55 protesters in Cairo were arrested by the security officers (Human 
Rights Watch 2010, Chick 2010, Giglo 2011). Khaled Said’s death became especially 
important for the Egyptian youth because he became a symbol during the revolution.  
 
Bohn (2011) indicates that the rights of the Egyptian youth had been minimal before 
25
th
 of January 2011 revolution. Corruption existed in every field, including in the 
elections, and there was no freedom of expression (Bohn 2011: 76).  The police were 
the most frequent points of contact between the people and the regime (Trager 
2011:82). They were abusive and invented violations, frequently confiscating licenses, 
and the citizens had to bribe the police officers (Anderson 2011: 325). The police 
brutality in the country had become unbearable for many young Egyptians, and the 
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killing of Khaled Said, was the final straw (MacLeod 2011: 88-89, Anderson 2011: 
325). The death of Khaled Said was a culmination of many years of struggle for 
several rights; the right to organization, to gathering, to democracy, social and 
economic rights, to a minimum wage and to the right to strike (MacLeod 2011: 119).   
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Chapter 4: Method 
 
Based on the study’s topic and the research question, qualitative research design has 
been used. By using qualitative data, that is to say text, it becomes possible to better 
understand the meaning given of a phenomenon. Quantitative research is 
advantageous when the aim is to study the extensions and relationships between 
variables (Bryson 2006: 64). Qualitative study, however, offers more space for getting 
under the skin of these phenomena, describe them and understand what they imply for 
the individuals involved (Repstad 1998). When we want to explain a social 
phenomenon, we must use the individuals as a starting point (Gilje & Grimen 2002: 
202). Individuals are created by the social systems in which they find themselves. 
They are products of the social systems in which they live and work (Gilje & Grimen 
2002: 215). Furthermore, a qualitative approach is suitable for an open and 
exploratory research design, where the phases of the research question, interviews, 
analysis, interpretation, and report writing interact throughout the process (Thagaard 
2003: 27). The main material of this study consists of semi-structured interviews with 
young people who participated actively in the protests in Tahrir Square, as well as a 
small number of interviews with area specialists. In addition, I used scientific 
literature and documentation on social movements in general, and the protest in Tahrir 
Square in particular. 
 
4.1 Research design and approach 
This research consists of a single case study: The upheavals in Tahrir Square in Egypt 
in 2011. Case studies are often based on an in-depth investigation of “an instance of a 
class of events” (George & Bennett 2005: 17) or of a single individual group. The 
study focuses on one “instance” in Egypt, namely the upheavals in Tahrir Square in 
2011.  Case study is commonly defined as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context” (Yin 2003: 13). In this 
research, the “contemporary phenomenon” that has been studied is social movement 
and the factors that motivated the Egyptian youth to take part in the 18 days long 
protest in Tahrir Square. By using the case study method, one has the opportunity to 
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use a variety of data and going more deeply into the cases in question. The possibility 
of using multiple sources of evidence, is also recognized as one of the main 
advantages of the case study method, and increases its quality substantially (Yin 
2003: 98). 
 
In order to explore the three hypotheses and unravel “the complex interaction between 
variables” (Schmitter 2006: 7) of the perspective of the Egyptian people, I will use a 
qualitative approach. There is a link between the choice of case study and the 
qualitative approach. Case studies have, according to George and Bennett (2005: 20), 
a “powerful advantage in the heuristic identification of new variables and hypotheses 
through the study of deviant or outlier cases and in the course of fieldwork”.  This 
applies to both archival research and interviews with participants, area experts and 
political activists. Therefore I have made three hypotheses for the empirical 
investigation, which is based on fieldwork and interviews with relevant participants. 
There has been limited focus on the Egyptian youth during the protests in Tahrir 
Square in 2011. This study examines the foundations of social movements, seeking to 
understand the factors that motivated the Egyptian youth to take part in the protests. 
According to Bryman (2004: 267-268), a qualitative approach is based on an 
interpretivist epistemological position that seeks to understand the social world 
through the interpretations of its participants. Through qualitative research, it is 
impossible to "freeze" the social settings and circumstances of a study so that it can be 
reproduced (Bryman 2004: 273). The goal, however, is to minimize errors and biases 
(Yin 2003: 37). In order to reduce the possibility of systematic bias in my case, I have 
used relevant secondary literature and other sources to enhance the level of reliability 
(Yin 2003: 99). 
 
I believe the qualitative method offers a better approach for in-depth study of the 
youth’s opinions in terms of different political, cultural, social and economic factors, 
and how this motivated them to take part in the protests. In this research we know the 
outcome: the Egyptian youth who took part in the protests wanted the fall of the 
Mubarak regime. However, we do not know which factors motivated them to take 
action. The factors will therefore be studied in order to understand what changes in 
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the society the Egyptian youth really wanted. Since little research has been done on 
the rationale behind the perspective of the Egyptian youth, this study has an 
explanatory purpose.  
 
Since this research is an in-depth analysis, the focus is on a single group in the 
Egyptian society: the higher educated youth, respectively young people from the 
middle-class between 16 and 30 years old, who took part in the protests in Tahrir 
Square between 25
th
 of January and 11
th
 of February. There are several reasons why 
this target group has been chosen. First, it is expected that this group would have a 
clearer aim and reason for taking part in the protests.  This group is higher educated, 
has access to many sources of media and has knowledge about civil rights. The 
thinking processes of these people provide important information about the future of 
Egypt: what role does the thinking process of the youth play in the society and what 
effect can it have on their country. Secondly, the educated youth played a significant 
role in the revolution (Shahine 2011; Ez-Eldin 2011; Henry & Springborg 2011). 
They were an important group who participated from the start of the revolution in the 
protests on the 25
th
 and 28
th
 of January and demanded political change (Joya 2011: 
370). Thirdly, they belong to the group of the “new generation” of Egypt who can 
develop and build up the country, since they are the higher educated people. The 
fourth reason, which is a practical reason, is that many people from this group can 
speak English. The interviews had to take place in English, since I do not speak 
Arabic.  
 
It is generally held that we cannot generalize on the basis of case studies because it is 
not possible to say anything in general about a larger group of instances on the basis 
of only one single instance. Although case studies are not statistically representative, 
they may be analytically representative. It needs to be noted that focusing on one 
particular group will not generate results that can be generalized over the whole 
Egyptian society. This again is not the aim of this research. Rather, the aim is to learn 
more about the most important factors that were the driving force in the youth’s 
decision to take active part in the 25
th
 of January 2011 revolution. Therefore, the 
results of this research can provide analytical representativeness.  
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4.2 Qualitative interview 
4.2.1 Interview as a research method 
Since this study has an explanatory purpose, all interviews have been semi-structured. 
In an explanatory interview, unstructured or open-ended questions are implemented in 
order to “understand the context” and “to develop familiarity” (Frey and Fontana 
1991: 180). One of the advantages in using semi-structured interviews is that one can 
meet the informants with openness to their opinions and thoughts on the subject. This 
will pave the way for a certain degree of independence in relation to the interviewer's 
own life-world, but also for the theory one has chosen to use. The interviews were 
formed as a conversation in which the questions and responses were standardized, 
with the purpose of obtaining descriptions of the interviewee’s life-world in order to 
interpret the significance of the described phenomena (Kvale 1996: 124-125).  
 
The interview questions are based on the three hypotheses I made after a perusal of 
secondary literature, and were divided into a number of topics that can answer the 
research question and can be used in the further processing of the analysis (Bryman 
2004: 321). Collected background material has been used to divide the interviews into 
a number of topics for the interview guide. The background material was found in 
connection with the review of existing literature in the field, and takes into account 
the various factors that may have been crucial for the youth’s motivation in 
participating in the protests in Tahrir Square. The background material has also been 
applied to design the interview guide, in addition to having been actively used in the 
subsequent analysis of the field. 
 
The interview guide was both instructive and ensured that relevant topics and 
sequences were identified and discussed in the interview. As Kvale states, “the 
questions relate to the topic of the interview, to the theoretical conceptions at the root 
of an investigation, and to the subsequent analysis” (Kvale 1996: 129). However, I 
related openly to the interviewee’s ideas and thoughts on the subject. The information 
that the interviewees have on the subject makes it possible to have a conversation that 
turns into knowledge of the research question (Brinkmann & Tanggard 2010: 30). 
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Another advantage of the qualitative research interview is that interviews can be 
developed along the way, and knowledge can thus be amplified (Kvale & Brinkmann 
2009: 43).  
 
4.2.2 Interviews 
In this qualitative study, in-depth interviews were conducted with 19 informants, 
which were an important part of the primary data collection. Since there is a lack of 
research on the reason why Egyptian youth decided to participate in the upheavals, I 
wanted to hear the perspectives from the people themselves. I interviewed 17 
Egyptian youths between the age of 19 and 30, of different backgrounds and political 
shadings that participated during the 18 days long protest in Tahrir Square. Out of the 
17 informants, only four of them were female. This is representative for the gender 
differences in Egypt. Although I only managed to interview four girls, it was 
important to get their views and opinions on the topic studied in this thesis, as well as 
their experiences, which were often quite different from those of the males. The 
interviews have offered invaluable insights towards a deeper understanding of what 
motivated the Egyptian youth to participate in the upheavals. In addition, I had two 
in-depth interviews with area specialists in order to gain a broader perspective and 
deeper insight into the problem, beyond the information provided by the secondary 
literature. My conversations with them have provided me with a more accurate and 
comprehensive outline of the case examined in this study. Also, by interviewing the 
youth participants as well as the area specialists, attempts have been made to 
distinguish between facts and opinions.  
 
Most of the interviews were conducted in Cairo, the largest and most important city of 
Egypt, in the month of September 2012. One of the interviews was conducted by 
using Skype,
8
 and one of the informants answered some questions via e-mail. All 
interviews were conducted in English. After inquiring among Egyptians via 
                                                         
8
 Skype is a software application that allows users to make voice and video calls and chat over the 
Internet.  
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Facebook
9
 and Viber
10
 before travelling to Cairo on how I should schedule meetings 
with Egyptian youths, I received several pieces of advice. Firstly, planning meetings 
far in advance is challenging in Egypt, as people mostly do not live by a clearly set 
schedule. Secondly, even though most Egyptian people of the target group do have 
access to the Internet, it is more effective to make appointments by phone instead of 
e-mail or social media. Thirdly, Cairo is a large city where it can take several hours to 
travel from one district to another. For informants it might take too much time and 
effort to reach a set location. This was especially difficult for the girls, as they face 
sexual harassment on a daily basis in the streets, which was an additional stress factor.  
 
Informants were recruited through four friends who have been former exchange 
students in Cairo. Each of them suggested one or two people who they knew had 
participated during the upheavals in Tahrir Square, from which a “snowball effect” 
could be generated. In this way I could “borrow” the trust of my intermediaries and 
let them pass on my request informally to the young people asking them if they were 
willing to be interviewed. Once the intermediaries gave the go-ahead, the informants 
were contacted via social media such as Facebook and Twitter
11
. Through the 
“snowball effect”, people from different social groups were targeted, which made a 
variety of informants possible. In addition, two informants were recruited via a former 
interviewee.  
 
Appointments were made by phone and text messages once I had arrived in Egypt, 
and the locations of the interviews were determined in agreement with the informants. 
Most of the interviews were held in public coffee places in different middle-class 
neighborhoods in Cairo, and in the homes of the informants. As an interviewer one 
should “be prepared to meet interviewees at a time and in a place convenient to them” 
(Thomas 1993: 87) and “…establish an atmosphere in which the subject feels safe 
                                                         
9 Facebook is a social networking site that allows you to make connections, share interests, and join 
groups.  
10 Viber is an instant messaging application for smartphones where you can text messages, send 
images, video and audio media messages.  
11 Twitter is an online social networking service and micro blogging service that enables its users to 
send and read text-based messages of up to 140 characters, known as “tweets”. 
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enough to talk freely about his or her experiences and feelings” (Kvale 1996: 125). 
The public locations were not an obstacle for the interviews, as the interviewees did 
not have any problems with stating their opinion in public. It was remarkable to see 
the openness of the informants in a post-dictatorial country. Furthermore, none of the 
informants had any problems with being recorded by a voice recorder, which was 
used to ensure the accuracy of the transcriptions of the interviews. There were two 
settings for the interviews: most of the people were interviewed individually and in 
one interview, two people were interviewed at the same time. Interviewing two 
people at the same time turned out to be useful because it revealed an interesting 
discussion between the participants.  
 
None of the interviews were alike. They had different lengths and shapes, different 
interviewees initiated different topics and various aspects were discussed. The 
interviews with the girls were often longer than the interviews with the males. For 
some of the informants, the interview would probably have been easier if it had been 
conducted in their native language, and some language problems had to be dealt with 
along the way. Having to work with the language also gave me an opportunity to 
discuss the meaning of the different statements. Talking without an interpreter made 
the interviews more flexible and enabled the informants to talk more freely around the 
various topics. However, what came up in the interviews was only what the 
informants themselves chose to tell me, which was their subjective understanding of 
their own thoughts, feelings, hopes, fears and thoughts about the society. Kvale 
(1996) emphasizes that the subjective way in which people understand the world, is a 
social reality that is truer than many attempts to extract knowledge about the world as 
something separate from the experiences of those involved. Through this 
phenomenological scientific view it is possible to understand young people's 
descriptions as key fragments and bricks in the understanding of the underlying 
factors behind the revolution in Tahrir Square.  
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4.2.3 The interview situation and the interviews’ validity  
None of the interviewees had seen the interview guide before the interview. However, 
all of the informants were informed about the possibility of anonymity in connection 
with the interviews before the interview commenced. The informants were open to the 
topics when they were informed that they would receive the transcribed interviews, so 
that they would have the opportunity to read through their quotes before the thesis 
deadline.  
 
Not all the information given through the interviews has been used in the analysis. At 
times, the informants gave detailed information about their personal lives and about 
cases of ill treatment and torture by the police and the former regime in Egypt. 
However, parts of the omitted information emerging from the interviews were used as 
background information regarding the attitudes of the interviewees. For that reason, I 
have chosen not to publish the transcribed interviews and the associated audio files. It 
was in order to create the necessary confidence between the interviewer and the 
informants, but also to take their safety into account. The quotes in the analysis are 
used with the purpose of illustrating key points.  
 
4.2.4 Analysis, interpretation and report writing  
All interviews were recorded on audio recorder and transcribed during the time of 
fieldwork. This job increased my knowledge of the material and became part of the 
interpretation process. In the further analysis, I did not use any other means than the 
usual word processing and printing. I coded the interview texts by sorting parts of the 
text under various topics from both theoretical perspectives and topics that the youths 
brought up. The interview guide was the same for all informants through a standard 
edition that I designed before travelling to Cairo. 
 
An important ethical issue in report writing and interpretation work is the informants’ 
rights to be portrayed the way they see themselves. All interviewees have therefore 
received the transcribed interviews, and thus had the opportunity to comment on 
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things that were – in their opinion - unclear in the interviews. For the social scientist, 
it is also important to see connections and to theorize beyond the specific 
representation the informants give of themselves, as opposed to a purely journalistic 
representation. 
 
My attempts to interpret what the interviewees tell me, implies a move away from 
their understandings. When I have also tried to draw in theory and concepts, I move 
yet another step away. While this may provide insight into the social contexts and 
processes, it may be at the expense of the self-perception of those I have talked to. I 
have tried to solve the problem by distinguishing as clearly as possible between my 
interpretation and the person's statement. However, the dilemma between production 
of knowledge, my perspectives and the person’s integrity cannot be completely 
solved. In report writing there is also an ethical issue related to how information 
appears, and how it can be used. The youth informants I interviewed will therefore 
remain anonymous in this research in order to take their safety into account, and are 
therefore given fictitious names. Asmaa Mahfouz is the only exception, as she has 
chosen not to be anonymous. The area specialists will be presented by their names.  
 
4.3 Operationalization of the hypotheses 
The first hypothesis suggests that the youth participated in the protests because they 
wanted to protest against the political, economic and social order. The role of the 
family and the generational differences are deeply rooted in all parts of the society in 
Egypt, and have therefore a strong impact on the lives of the youth. In order to find 
out whether the youth wanted to protest against the social order, we first need to 
examine how the young people perceive the differences between the older and the 
younger generation in Egypt, and to what degree this motivated them to protest. 
Secondly, we need to find out their families’ views on the Mubarak regime, and if 
there were divisions in the family that may have had an impact on the youths’ 
decision to protest. Further, questions need to be asked about the youths’ living and 
working situation during the regime of Mubarak in order to get an indication of 
whether they were motivated by the political and economic order. The answers to 
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these questions will decide how much impact the first hypothesis has on our 
perception of what motivated the youth to participate in the protests, and therefore 
how this hypothesis should be weighted.  
 
The second hypothesis holds that the upheaval in Tunisia was a motivation for the 
youth to participate in the protests in Tahrir Square. In order to avoid mutually 
exclusive answers from each of the informants, the questions about Tunisia’s impact 
on the Egyptian youth have to be open. Therefore, the emphasis of the questions has 
to be on the role played by the upheavals in Tunisia. The more extensive the answers, 
and the more importance the informants ascribe to this subject, the more this 
hypothesis is strengthened.  
 
According to my third hypothesis, the youth were motivated by the issues and 
circumstances around the killing of Khaled Said. It is important to emphasize the 
symbolic effect of the death of Khaled Said on the young people, since they identified 
themselves with his situation. Therefore, the questions regarding the youths’ personal 
life conditions are supposed to be closely linked to their experience and understanding 
of the significance of Khaled Said’s death. Firstly, we need to ask what thoughts the 
informants had about the rights of youth in Egypt prior to the fall of the Mubarak 
regime. To this end we can see how, and to what degree, their descriptions of the 
youths’ situation include topics such as bribery, brutality, and police harassment. 
Secondly, the questions regarding this hypothesis need to be asked in a wide-open 
way so that the informants can speak freely, without being led by the questions. Thus, 
the questions should lay emphasis on topics such as the rights of youth, their role in 
the society and whether they are treated with respect in that society, and not ask 
directly about the issues and circumstances related to the killing of Khaled Said. 
However, the more open the questions, the more likely it is that you may get answers 
pointing in various directions, such as unemployment, family structures, religion, and 
education. In that case, the hypothesis is weakened. Nevertheless, if the answers to the 
questions clearly indicate that the issues and circumstances around the death of 
Khaled Said were a motivating factor, then the hypothesis is strengthened.   
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Chapter 5: Analysis & Data 
 
The empirical case analysis is conducted as follows: I will first examine each of the 
hypotheses systematically in order to determine whether they are plausible or not. 
Then I will discuss and evaluate the hypotheses. The findings will be connected to the 
theory in chapter three throughout this chapter.  
 
5.1 Hypothesis: Protest against the political, economic and social 
order 
5.1.1 “We didn’t have a dream”  
When I asked my informants if they could describe the rights of youth during the 
Mubarak regime, one of them said: “It’s simple: the only right you had was to remain 
silent” (“Abdelrahman” 2012 interview). A great majority of the informants 
described the youth’s situation as hopeless. Although there were high rates of 
unemployment in all of the social classes in the society, the unemployment rate was 
highest among the educated youth, especially those who have a university degree 
(Goldstone 2011: 336; UNDP 2010: 61; Muñoz 2000: 20): “The more educated you 
were, the less likely you were to find a job that you were expecting” (Barsalou 2012 
interview)12. This is true in many societies, also in Egypt. Regardless of how much 
education they had, and how hard they worked, the youth I interviewed said they were 
not treated with any respect in the society. It was common for people who did not 
have as much experience or education to get good jobs because they had connections 
or their family had money (Shahine 2011). As one of my informants said, “You didn’t 
get a job based on qualification. There were no standards, and that’s why we didn’t 
have a dream” (“Mokhtar” 2012 interview). Further, it was – and still is - easier for 
the older generation to get a job, simply because they are older (UNDP 2010; Ibrahim 
& Wassed 2000). “Nasser was young when he was president. Therefore he had to 
have an older person next to him, which was Mohammed Naguib. This is a cultural 
issue” (“Mourad” 2012 interview), as one of my informants pointed out. The society 
                                                         
12 Judy Barsalou is a visiting scholar at the American University in Cairo.  
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in general, and the older people in particular, do not accept the fact that younger 
people can be more qualified for a job than someone from the older generation 
(UNDP 2010).  
 
Several of the youth interviewed said they had decided to participate in the protests in 
Tahrir Square, simply because they did not have anything else to do, in the sense that 
they were staying at home because they were unemployed, felt disconnected to the 
society and were afraid that there was never going to be a change in their country. The 
Tahrir Square thus served as a place, which Bayat (1997: 15; 2011b) calls ‘Street 
Politics’, where they could express their discontent collectively. For many of them, 
their living situation had become so unbearable that they were willing to risk their 
lives. The social conditions that were previously regarded as unfortunate yet tolerable 
had now been redefined as unjust through collective action. “We were willing to give 
up our lives in order to improve the country. We didn’t have any respect in the society, 
no opportunities. We were undesired, so what did we have to lose?” (“Noura” 2012 
interview).  
 
In contrast, the older generation was mainly focusing on how to survive. They had to 
take care of their family and their only concern was how to get money in order to 
bring food to the table (Barsalou 2012 interview, Hakim 2012 interview13, “Noura” 
2012 interview). One informant pointed out that the Mubarak regime succeeded in 
making the citizens circle around him. He made people struggle and therefore only 
think about themselves and what they should do in order to survive. The older 
generation was not concerned about politics. Rather, they were focusing on the 
problems in their life. “My parents didn’t agree with Mubarak, but they didn’t despise 
him. They were thinking, “We will live with his regime, no problem.” They were 
focusing on surviving, that’s it” (“Anwar” 2012 interview), as one informant 
pointed out. Many of the older people never thought they would see the fall of the 
Mubarak regime. Although Mubarak was unpopular among many, the people had 
difficulty in believing that the oppositional groups could topple him and his regime 
                                                         
13 Randa Hakim is a Communication and Media Adviser at the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Cairo. 
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(Cook 2009: 57-58). In other words, the citizens did not perceive the probability that 
collective action would lead to success in overthrowing the regime. This is typical for 
closed systems, where “contention is restrained by fear of repression” (Tarrow 2011: 
165).  
 
According to Alexander (2011: 8), it was neither sectional nor individual interests that 
drove the revolution. Rather, it was a shared commitment to reconstructing the 
community, where the desire to reform the country was what brought them together. 
The protests in Tahrir Square can be viewed as the youths’ “repertoire of contention” 
(Tarrow 2011: 39), where the shared interest was an immediate change. As Asmaa 
Mahfouz said, “We, the younger generation, had to take our rights by our hands. We 
did not question it, and the revolution was the best way to make it happen” (Mahfouz 
2012 interview). Thus, the youth can be regarded as the “challengers” (Tarrow 
2011: 167) who express a strong dissatisfaction and helped lay the basis for political 
mobilization. As the youths’ regarded their lives as stuck in drudgery, the possibility 
to participate in collective action was an incentive in itself, even though it could be 
risky. Moreover, the youth can be regarded as the “early risers” (Tarrow 2011: 167) 
who had the capacity to mobilize and make claims on the authorities, whereas the 
older generation can be viewed as the “resource-poor group” (ibid.) with less capacity. 
 
5.1.2 “There is a small Mubarak sitting in every system of the society”  
When I asked my informants how they understand the difference between the older 
and the younger generation, one of them answered:  
“It’s actually very simple. I was once arguing with my mom and she told me a sentence that really 
sums everything up: “What you say is wrong with a slight possibility of being right, and what I say is 
right with a slight possibility of being wrong.” (Abdelrahman, 19 interview).  
Egypt is still a very hierarchical society, where hierarchy is a function of age, gender 
and class (Barsalou 2012 interview; Hakim 2012 interview; UNDP 2010: 95). 
Family plays a very important role in the Egyptian society. They are tightly knit, and 
often provide a big level of both social and financial support (Bayat 1997: 96). At the 
same time, families can be relatively conservative. Young people coming from those 
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kinds of families are more likely to be regulated by the older generation in the family. 
Especially young girls – regardless of religion – are closely watched by their family 
members (Barsalou 2012 [interview; UNDP 2010; Assaad & Barsoum 2007). During 
the Mubarak regime, there was a very “intrusive interest in regulating social behavior” 
(Barsalou 2012 interview), and women were considered “second-class 
citizens”(Bayat 2010: 96) in many areas of public life. All of the females interviewed 
for this thesis stated that the social order was a factor motivating them to participate in 
the protests in Tahrir Square. They wanted to see a change in the society between the 
rights of men and women. One informant said: 
“My family has always told me what to do and what not to do. I always have to ask my father if I can 
do something or not. If he says no, then that’s final. And when I get married, I need to ask my husband 
for permission. Sometimes the men say no because they have the power to do so. I was hoping that 
women would gain more respect in the society through the revolution in Tahrir.” (Asmaa Mahfouz 
2012 interview) 
Some of the parents disapproved their participation in the revolution, especially in the 
beginning. “When I told my father that I wanted to participate in the revolution, he 
started screaming at me and locked me up in my room for three days” (“Sonya” 2012 
interview), as one of my informants told me. Interestingly, the female informants 
understood their parents’ reactions, even though they disagreed with them. Many 
parents insisted that it was for their own safety. However, the informants thought that 
it also had to do with the fact that their parents were afraid to lose both face and their 
jobs if it became known that their sons and daughters protested against the social and 
political order in the society. Thus, their parents wanted to avoid even modest costs of 
protest because they perceived the risks and costs of collective action as higher than 
the chances of success. Their fear of repression may have constrained them from 
acting collectively, even though the threats turned out to be more seeming than real. 
Moreover, it is not easy to convince people who are normally passive that their 
injustices can be challenged. “It’s like there is a small Mubarak sitting in every 
system of the society” (“Basel” 2012 interview), one of the informants said.  
 
On 18 January 2011, one week before the protest, Asmaa Mahfouz, a veiled young 
woman who was then twenty-six years old, made a statement on Facebook, saying 
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that she would not wait until the 25
th
 of January to make a change (Khalil 2012: 130-
131). She wrote down her cellphone number and urged people to go with her to Tahrir 
Square that evening. Only a few people showed up. No one in the square paid any 
attention to her chants, until the police showed up and wanted to arrest her: “People 
came and talked with the police, apologizing on my behalf and saying that I was crazy, 
so that they wouldn’t arrest me” (Mahfouz 2012 interview). That night she decided 
to post a video on YouTube in order to make herself heard. Instead of directing her 
anger at the government and the police, she spoke directly to the men – especially 
Muslim men – to prove their manhood to her: 
“I told them: “If you think of yourself as a man, come out. Whoever says that women shouldn’t go out 
to protest because they’ll get beaten, let him have some honor and manhood and come out in the street 
on January 25. If you have honor and dignity as a man, then come out and protect me and the other 
girls at the protest.”(Mahfouz 2012 interview).  
At the end of the video, she quoted the Quran, section 13, saying “God will never 
change the condition of a people until they change what is in them.” In this way, 
Mahfouz used both religion and courage as a way of convincing Egyptian men to take 
to the streets. By showing that she was a tiny, veiled, fearless and angry young 
woman she dared the men to prove that they had as much courage and dignity as she 
had. She wanted to tell all people that they should not be afraid if they stood together, 
and that there would be hope for change in the society if people took action: “You 
can’t wait for other people to take to the streets. You have to start by yourself.” 
(Mahfouz 2012 interview).  
 
According to Gamson (1992: 73), the challengers must share the injustice frame in a 
public way so that it can be collectively adopted. Through the video manifesto, 
Mahfouz inscribed grievances publicly in frames that identified an injustice and 
attributed the responsibility for it to others. By putting issues on the agenda that other 
people identified with, she broke a barrier, which paved the way for others to 
participate and make their demands heard (Tarrow 2011: 167). Although it is difficult 
to know how much impact Mahfouz’s video had on people to dare showing up for the 
protests, she was mentioned as one of the reasons by several people in the first week 
of the revolution (Khalil 2012: 132). She became an inspiration to Egyptian women, 
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and a direct challenge to the men’s “prized self-perceptions of what it meant to be a 
man” (Khalil 2012: 133). In other words, Asmaa Mahfouz can be regarded as what 
Tarrow (2011: 167) defines as one of the “strategically more savvy” challengers with 
mobilization capacity that seized the moment and took part in starting a process of 
change, and expanded the opportunity for others. 
 
5.1.3 “The system must change before the people will change” 
Since the Egyptian Republic’s first autocrat, Gamal Abdel Nasser, came to power, 
there has been lack of modern institutions that could channel citizen participation 
peacefully (Fukuyama 2011). The combination of widespread corruption, patronage, 
nepotism and economic reform did not benefit the majority of the Egyptian people, 
and contrasted sharply with the almost complete absence of political change (Haass 
2011: 115).  The political space available to Egypt’s opposition in the public sphere 
was closed, as it had also been several times previously during the leadership of 
Nasser and Sadat (Cook 2009: 66). People were taught not to think or act. In this way, 
the autocracy had succeeded in preventing oppositional political performance from 
occurring (Alexander 2011: 36-37). The fear of repression, which exist in closed 
systems and dictatorships (Angrist 2011: 77, Tarrow 2011: 165), restrained the 
Egyptian people from contention. Thus, the people did not run the risks and pay the 
costs of engaging in social protest actions because they believed that their chances of 
succeeding were low. As one informant expressed: “Egyptians are kind. We accept 
things in order to survive. The system made us so weak. They really tried to kill our 
souls” (“Basel” 2012 interview).  
 
In interviews, the informants described that the citizens in general, and young people 
in particular, were excluded from politics.  Young people were not welcomed to any 
type of public policy or decision-making during the regime of Mubarak (UNDP 2010: 
222; Samad & Mohamadieh 2011: 113; Osman 2011; 223). The Egyptian people did 
not feel that they were united. Instead, the youth felt they were alienated from their 
own society (UNDP 2010: 111; Meijer 2000: 1), which made them reach a point 
where they did not care anymore. “We were thinking that this was Mubarak and his 
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regime’s country, and we were just living there. He didn’t respect our minds. We had 
enough and stopped caring” (“Mourad” 2012 interview), one informant pointed out. 
Not only were the Egyptian youth alienated from their own society. They were also 
humiliated, which alone can be a powerful motivator (Haass 2011: 115). One of my 
informants said that seeing how the society treated them, simply because they were 
young, made them feel very humiliated, and that this motivated them to join the 
protests in Tahrir Square. Interestingly, several of the people who were interviewed 
expressed that they did not only join the protests to regain their own rights. Rather, 
they were demanding rights for all people, including the poor. This contradicts the 
negative descriptions of Egyptian youth as being “selfish, individualistic and passive” 
(UNDP 2010: 221).  
 
Although there were several political demands made by the Egyptian people who 
participated during the 18 days of protest in Tahrir Square (Khalil 2012: 135-136; 
Atassi 2011; El Mahdi 2012), a majority of my informants believed that they all were 
united under one goal from the first day, which was the downfall of the Mubarak 
regime. “Mubarak was just a symbol of the regime and what was happening, and 
overthrowing him was just the head of the goat” (“Sadek” 2012 interview), as one 
informant uttered. By framing the political issues in a way that appealed to a broad 
audience, the people in Tahrir Square also managed to trigger ordinary citizens into 
action around a common theme they all agreed upon: Isqat Al-Nizaam (the downfall 
of the regime) (Khalil 2012: 144; El Mahdi 2012: 144; Shehata 2011: 137).  
 
Interestingly, some of my informants pointed out that many people from the older 
generation that were present in Tahrir Square disapproved the formulation of this 
demand. They sympathized with Mubarak as a person, saying that he was an old guy, 
and that it was the people around him that were to blame. Therefore, some of the 
young people in Tahrir Square came with a statement, urging people to chant that they 
wanted the end of the regime, not Mubarak. “We did that so all people could gather 
under it, not only the people who wanted the downfall of Mubarak, but also include 
people who were against the calling of his name” (“Basel” 2012 interview), one 
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informant said. Through this inclusive, yet strategic, approach, the different demands 
were merged into one main slogan (Khalil 2012: 144; El Mahdi 2012: 144; Shehata 
2011: 137). In this way, the political issues became framed in specific grievances in a 
way that allowed for participation of all Egyptians, regardless of class (El Mahdi 
2012: 144), and the people managed finding a “common purpose” (della Porta & 
Diani 2006: 21) without being identical. Thus, the revolution in Egypt began when the 
people, who had earlier been described as both apathetic and apolitical (Shehata 2011: 
141; Bayat 2011b: 51; El Amrani 2011: 148), found their voice (Alexander 2011: 23), 
through articulating their collective claims.  
 
For several years, Mubarak had managed to divide the Egyptian people by treating 
people differently, be it Muslims versus Christians, the old generation versus the 
younger generation, the rich versus the poor (Cook 2009). The informants said that 
Mubarak did not care about gathering the people in order to get support, “he had his 
family and the people who worked for him, and that was enough for him to stay in 
power” (“Mourad” 2012, interview). However, the people who were gathered in 
Tahrir Square represented all parts of society, and were asking for the same demand: 
the downfall of the regime (Khalil 2012: 144; El Mahdi 2012: 144; Shehata 2011: 
137). This appealed to everyone in Egypt, regardless of his or her ideological position 
(Gause 2011: 207; Atassi 2011: 33). The slogan unified the groups that wanted a 
regime change without necessarily systemic changes that would jeopardize their 
interests (El Mahdi 2012: 144), and thus laid the basis for political mobilization. The 
state’s “capacity for repression” (Tarrow 2011: 160) declined when the people in 
Tahrir Square were allied as one group.  
 
On the night of 10 February, the people in Tahrir Square believed that Mubarak 
would announce his resignation during his much-expected speech (Filiu 2011: 39). 
The president talked to his “fellow citizens, sons, the young men and women of 
Egypt”, saying: 
“Today I address Egypt’s youth in Tahrir Square and all throughout Egypt. I am speaking to you all 
from the heart, as a father to his sons and daughters, and I tell you that I am proud of you as a symbol 
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of a new Egyptian generation calling for change for the better, and holding on to change and dreaming 
of the future and fashioning it” (CBC News 2011).  
Further on in the speech, he gave his promise that neither he nor his son, Gamal, 
would run in the next presidential elections, and that he would be staying in office 
until September 2011 (El Mahdi 2012: 144). Mubarak’s paternalistic tone made the 
people in Tahrir Square react very differently (Filiu 2011: 39-40). Some of the 
informants said that the older generation had wanted to see gradual change. “They 
were always trying to be good in their positions, thinking that this is going to change 
the system, which is never right. The system must change before the people will 
change” (“Basel” 2012 interview).  
 
For the older generation to hear that Mubarak and his son would not run for election 
was more than they expected. According to several of the informants, the older 
generation were moved by his speech and believed him, some even wanted to give 
him another chance. “My mom called me and said that we should be satisfied with the 
accomplishment and go home” (“Noura” 2012 interview), one informant told me. 
However, the reactions from the younger generation were entirely different. 
Mubarak’s tactic of talking to his people like they were his sons had provoked the 
youth even more (Filiu 2011: 39), and made them decide it was better to “stay in 
Tahrir and die with dignity” (“Noura” 2012 interview). As one informant expressed, 
“we, the younger generation, were fed up. We were done with emotions, we just 
wanted him to step down” (“Sayid” 2012 interveiw). However, according to several 
of the informants, many of the young people in Tahrir Square started chanting, urging 
people not to go home. Mubarak’s promise to not run for election was not enough, 
people should not go home before the whole regime resigned from their positions. 
Through his speech and his promise not to re-run for election, Mubarak had revealed 
the decline for the regime’s capacity for repression. This made the challengers – the 
youth in Tahrir Square– see opportunities to “advance their claims” (Tarrow 2011: 
160), which was also illustrated later during the 18 days of protest, when more 
demands were presented by the citizens (Khalil 2012: 136; Shehata 2011: 143). Thus, 
the combination of opportunities, threats and the declining capability for repression 
by the authorities enhanced the possibility of regime change (Tarrow 2011: 161).   
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5.2 Hypothesis: The uprising in Tunisia 
5.2.1 “The answer is Tunisia” 
When being asked from where the Egyptian youth got their motivation when they 
decided to participate in the protests, a great majority of the informants answered that 
it was first of all the revolution in Tunisia. Many of the interviewees sat glued to their 
TV screens as they watched the Tunisians celebrate their triumph: “I was watching 
the news and crying. I couldn’t believe what was happening over there” (“Mokhtar” 
2012 interview). As political opportunities may not always be apparent, they must 
be perceived and attributed to becoming the source of mobilization (McAdam et al. 
2001; Meyer 2004). Even though the objective reasons for a revolution were present 
in the country, the upheavals in Tunisia helped to accelerate the Egyptian revolution 
(MacLeod 2011: 90). The Tunisian people serve as what Tarrow (2011: 167) call the 
“early risers” for the Egyptian people, by making claims and exposing weaknesses in 
authoritarian regimes that were not evident before it had been challenged. In this way, 
the Tunisians showed the Egyptians that a revolution was possible, and that a 
sustained public and peaceful movement could overthrow a dictator (Atassi 2011; 
Ghonim 2012): “The uprising in Tunisia gave us the tool to believe that we can also 
make it. It made us feels that it was possible” (“Basel” 2012 interview).  
 
When the informants were asked about what role they think the upheavals in Tunisia 
had played for the participation of the Egyptian youth in the protests in Tahrir Square, 
their answers differed. Some of the informants pointed out that they did not think that 
the revolution would have happened, if it had not been for the upheavals in Tunisia. 
One informant said:  
“Before the success of the revolution in Tunisia, I was thinking, “Maybe we can make a revolution, a 
protest one day.” I wasn’t sure. But when I saw the success of the revolution in Tunisia, I decided to 
protest as well” (“Ismael” 2012 interview).  
Others said that they thought the revolution in Egypt would have taken place 
regardless of what had happened in their neighbor country. However, all of the 
informants pointed out that the upheavals in Tunisia had shown them how to 
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overthrow a regime. “I shared a picture of the Tunisian flag on Facebook. Under it 
was written, “The answer is Tunisia” (“Basel” 2012 interview), one informant said.  
 
Goldstone & Tilly (2001: 183) argue that “a group may decide to bear very high costs 
for protest if it believes the chance of success are high”. Not only did the Tunisian 
people’s success in overthrowing a dictator demonstrate to the Egyptian people the 
effects collective action could have. It also gave the Egyptian youth extra courage and 
the belief they needed in order to act (Ghonim 2012): “Tunisia showed us that you 
can make it, that you could demand your rights. When we looked at them we knew it 
was possible to have a different society. Tunisia showed us the way” (“Tarek” 2012 
interview).  
 
5.2.2 Tunisia: the element of surprise 
According to Tarrow (2011: 164), people may be constrained from acting collectively 
by threats of repression. Tunisia played a fundamental role in the positivity of change, 
and made many Egyptians discover how weak those authoritarian and autocratic 
regimes actually were, by showing that the threats of repression were “more apparent 
than real” (Tarrow 2011: 164). According to the informants, the greatest achievement 
in the wake of the upheavals in Tunisia was that they were no longer afraid. The 
Tunisian revolution awakened the idea that the people would have the ability to topple 
an authoritarian regime (Khalil 2012: 123; Ghonim 2012). By overthrowing Ben Ali, 
the Tunisian people had exposed the vulnerability of authoritarian regimes. In this 
way, the Tunisian people became what Tarrow (2011: 160) defines as an “external 
resource”, that made the Egyptian people see an opportunity to put and end to the 
injustices also in their own country, and thus lowered the cost of collective action.  As 
one informant expressed: “We were not afraid of our dictator anymore” 
(“Abdelrahman” 2012 interview).  
 
Many of the informants mentioned that they had realized that their country had many 
similarities with Tunisia. Having a “common purpose and a shared commitment to a 
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cause” (della Porta & Diani 2006: 21) made the Egyptian and Tunisian youth feel 
compatible and linked to each other.  Firstly, both of the countries had aging autocrats 
(Angrist 2011). Secondly, both had military regimes that were suffering from 
nepotism, where a single family and those who had close connections to them were 
involved in most aspects of public and economic life (Trager 2011; Khalil 2012). 
Thirdly, both countries had developed into ruling systems, indifferent to their citizens’ 
needs and desires (Khalil 2012: 127-128). As one informant stated: “The system was 
the same. It just changed shapes. But the system of oppression was the same”(“Basel” 
2012 interview). Additionally, it made the Egyptian people perceive “the probability 
that social protest actions will lead to success” (Goldstone & Tilly 2001: 182), and 
that they also would be capable of overthrowing their own regime.  
 
Decisions regarding collective action are shaped by how threats and opportunities 
combine (Tarrow 2011: 161), and where the attitude toward risk depends on whether 
the outcome is perceived as a gain or a loss (Quattrone & Tversky 1988:722). A few 
of the interviewees mentioned that the Egyptian people started paying more attention 
to what was happening in their country, as a direct result of the upheavals in Tunisia. 
Once they witnessed the fall of Ben Ali, the Egyptian people woke up and started 
paying attention, even those who were not interested in politics (Khalil 2012: 123). 
That was considered impossible, never likely to happen. So “if it could happen there, 
it could happen in Egypt” (Barsalou 2012 interview). By succeeding in claiming the 
downfall of Ben Ali, the upheavals in Tunisia could be regarded as the “master frame” 
(Tarrow 2011: 167) of the Egyptian revolution, since they could identify with the 
issues of their neighbor country. Although contention had been largely restrained by 
fear of repression in Egypt, this fear now focused on the risks and costs they would 
continue to face if they did not take action, now that they had witnessed the Tunisian 
people succeeding in overthrowing an autocrat. Thus, the combination of the threats 
the Egyptian people were facing in their country and the opportunities that were 
presented to them through the success of the Tunisian revolution helped shape the 
youths’ decisions in taking collective action.  
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Another issue mentioned by some of the informants was the fact that there had always 
been a sense of brotherly Arab competitiveness between the two countries. Several of 
the informants told that Egyptians have always been considered both the cultural and 
political leaders in the Arab region. “I was thinking: “If they made it, then why can’t 
we?” We’re Egyptians! We can do anything if we put our minds into it” (“Sadek” 
2012 interview). Witnessing the Tunisians accomplishing what the Egyptian people 
had not yet managed to do had reawakened their competitive pride, almost as though 
liberation were an African Cup match (Khalil 2012: 145). “Having such a successful 
prototype encourages you to think that you can achieve the same” (“Fouad” 2012 
interview), one informant pointed out.  
 
5.2.3 The role of the social media 
Internet activism, such as social media, has become a technique that is familiar in 
various movements. This technique has both transformed the strategy of protest 
movements and made collective action more reflective (Carroll & Hacket 2006: 89). 
Joseph (2012: 146) defines social media as a group of Internet-based applications and 
platforms that allow for interactive participation by users, as well as allowing the 
creation and exchange of user generated content. People share information on social 
networking sites, where Facebook and Twitter are among the most popular (Joseph 
2012: 148).  The conversations on social networks are not merely limited to one-to-
one conversation, but enables conversation from many-to-many (Zakaria 2011).  
 
Communication and learning serve as important mechanisms for mobilizing around 
opportunities (Tarrow 2011: 164). Many of the informants mentioned the importance 
of social media before and during the protests. Through social medias such as 
Facebook and Twitter, Tunisian and Egyptian youth started writing to each other, thus 
creating wide-ranging networks, which extended into the virtual world (Ghonim 
2012; Joseph 2012; Atassi 2012). Through contact via the social media, framing and 
identity construction was created among the youth, which are important elements in 
creating solidarity between the movement participants and activating them (Tarrow 
2011:143). The Tunisian youth encouraged the Egyptian youth. One informant said: 
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“The Tunisians started writing to us in our groups on Facebook. All the information 
came from them. This was such a great motivation for us. We were overwhelmed by 
the support we got” (“Noura” 2012 interview). Several of the informants pointed out 
that the Egyptian youth learned a lot from their neighbor country. Tunisian youth 
gave specific and practical advices on how to succeed in overthrowing their regime 
(Joseph 2012):  
“We were following every single step via Facebook. They wrote what we should do and what not to do. 
They told us how to cope with tear gas by putting coca cola or vinegar in our faces. How else should 
we know these things?” (Mahfouz 2012 interview).  
The advices given by the Tunisian youth can be seen as what Tarrow (2011: 160) 
refers to as “external resources”, which helped the Egyptian youth to cease their 
compliance. The advices helped them identify their opportunities, and it also 
increased the Egyptians’ opportunities for contention. In addition, they helped to 
demonstrate the utility of collective action that the Egyptian youth could copy or 
develop further.  
 
According to Atassi (2011:32), modern means of communication did not only enable 
young people to think collectively. They also made it possible for the revolution to 
take place in genuine freedom. Through social media the Egyptian youth were able to 
enjoy freedom of speech, which they had been prevented from in other areas (Atassi 
2011: 32; Shahine 2011: 2; Shehata 2011: 142): “We were no longer afraid of 
protesting for our rights” (“Hazem” 2012 interview). Thus, the social media served 
as a place where the Egyptian youth could frame their grievances and dignify their 
claims, get in touch with others, and produce a collective identity, which helped shape 
the form of the uprising (Idle & Nunns 2011: 19).  
 
Although social media played a significant role for the Egyptian youth both before 
and during the protests in Tahrir Square (Ghonim 2012; Joseph 2012), some of the 
informants emphasized that the means of communication was not the reason for the 
revolution to happen. Rather, it was an important tool for exchanging information 
between the Tunisian and Egyptian youth that served to expand their opportunity for 
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contention (Shahine 2011: 2; Shehata 2011). One informant expressed, “If we hadn’t 
had the social media, we would have found another way of communicating and 
exchanging ideas. Revolutions have happened before, and social media didn’t exist 
then, but they still succeeded” (“Noura” 2012 interview). Furthermore, social media 
are not decisive, as they can both be repressed and employed by governments (Haass 
2011: 115).  
 
Tarrow (2011:30) argues that it is when people meet face-to-face that collective 
action is activated and sustained. On January 27, the Mubarak regime shut down the 
Internet for five days in a futile attempt to stop the protests (Abdo 2011: 165; Stacher 
2011: 100). Although this disrupted social media communications, some of the 
informants said they thought the Internet blackout backfired and increased the protest 
activity, because getting out in the street “was the only way to find out what was 
happening” (“Fadel” 2012 interview).  In this case, the social media had served as a 
tool for “communication and networking among the actors” (Bayat 1997: 16). 
However, when the Internet and telecommunication systems were blocked, the people 
took to the streets of Qasr al-Ayum, Qasr al-Nil, and Talaat Harb that all gather in the 
large traffic circle at the center of Tahrir Square. The people that gathered in the 
streets of Tahrir Square started communicating instantaneously and recognizing a 
common identity, which was mediated through space, and engaged instantaneously in 
collective action. ”This proved that when we believe in something, we don’t need to 
mobilize and be organized in order to act” (“Fayza” 2012 interview), one informant 
expressed. Thus, the use of public space, such as the streets of Tahrir Square, made it 
possible for the youth to mobilize without the help of  “an active network” (Bayat 
1997:16.).  
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5.3 Hypothesis: The issues and circumstances around the killing of 
Khaled Said 
5.3.1 “We are all Khaled Said” 
The police in Egypt are known to be both corrupt and abusive (Anderson 2011; 
Human Rights Watch 2010; Freedom House 2010; Transparency International 2010; 
Abu-Fadil 2011). For years, local protests and strikes had been carried out by 
educated youth in order to draw attention to police harassment and state corruption 
(Rabbani 2011: 12; Shahine 2011: 2; Ciezadlo 2011:233). According to some of the 
informants, the police murder of Khaled Said spiked the activism and unrest that had 
been growing steadily for a number of years in Egypt. Therefore, the Tunisian 
revolution sprouted easily in Egypt because the conditions for a revolt were already 
present and deep-rooted (El Mahdi 2012: 134). Thus, the Tunisian revolution had 
underscored and enhanced the seriousness and injustice of the social conditions that 
were similar to the conditions in Egypt, which had earlier been regarded as 
unfortunate yet tolerable by the people. As one informant pointed out: “Political life 
in Egypt was more mature than the political life in Tunisia. We have had some 
previous moments since 2004, like Kefaya, 6
th
 of April and protests around the 
killings of Khaled Said”(“Fouad” 2012 interview). Not only can the efforts made 
by the actors in the previous movements be regarded as fundamental in breaking the 
barrier of fear (El Mahdi 2012: 145), as well as increasing the opportunity for political 
space to open up by making the “challengers see opportunities to advance their claims” 
(Tarrow 2011: 160). They can also be considered as “early risers” who opened up 
institutional barriers, expanded the opportunities so that the demands of other groups 
could pour, as well as demonstrating the advantage of collective action that could be 
innovated upon (Tarrow 2011: 167).  
 
In June 2010, shortly after the killing of Khaled Said, a Facebook group was created 
with the name “Kullena Khaled Said” (“We are all Khaled Said”)14. The page gained 
a significant amount of youth followers, attracting more than a million supporters, and 
became the focal point for a number of large protests against state abuses during the 
                                                         
14
 The Facebook group was created by Wael Ghonim, a young computer engineer from Egypt who 
worked as a Head of Marketing at Google in the Middle East &North Africa.   
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summer of 2010 (Shehata 2011: 142). By framing specific grievances, namely police 
brutality and oppression, the page succeeded in uniting young people around one 
premise.  In this way, the youth managed to bypass some of the regime’s constraints 
on political and civil life (Khalil 2012; Shehata 2011: 142). The Facebook group can 
thus be regarded as a place where collective identity was developed among the many 
members of the group, where the death of Khaled Said both served as a creation of 
connectedness, and a cause they shared and were all committed to (della Porta & 
Diani 2006: 22).  
 
Social movements play an important role in “‘naming’ grievances and connect them 
to other grievances” (Snow & Benford 1992: 136). In this way, they construct “larger 
frames of meaning” (Tarrow 2011: 144) that will resonate with the cultural tendencies 
of the people. Just as Mohamed Bouazizi sparked off the protests in Tunisia that 
spread to the capital, the death of Khaled Said was called by some of the informants 
the tip of the iceberg for the Egyptian youth. Although the killing of Khaled Said did 
not affect the Egyptian people directly, some of the informants described it as a clear 
symbol of what was happening with the youth in Egypt. One informant said, “He was 
a young man from the middle-class, exactly like me, who had nothing to do with 
politics and was killed for no reason. He simply became a victim of police brutality 
that was directed against youth” (“Fadel” 2012 interview).  
 
According to McAdam (1999: 51), people must collectively define their situation as 
unjust before collective action can occur. The informants stated that young people did 
not have any rights, and the youth in particular were continuously facing violence and 
control by the police (Anderson 2011; Khalil 2012; Shahine 2011). “We didn’t have 
any rights. We were totally discriminated. It was total oppression” (“Basel” 2012 
interview), one informant said. Thus, the killing of Khaled Said became connected 
to other grievances in the society, and constructed “larger frames of meaning” 
(Tarrow 2011: 144), as it became a symbol of what was happening in the country in 
general and to the youth in particular. According to some of the informants, police 
brutality could actually be seen as an appalling state brutality, since the police were 
 50 
the most frequent points of contact between the people and the regime (Trager 
2011:82).  
 
Not only were the policemen known for their violence, which was often directed 
against the youth. They were also known for their corruption and bribery (Khalil 
2012; Abu-Fadil 2011; Anderson 2011; Human Rights Watch 2010; Freedom House 
2010; Transparency International 2010): “If I walked in the street at 2 a.m., the police 
officers would stop me for no reason whatsoever, search me and tell me to show them 
my ID. If I wanted the ID back, I had to pay them money” (“Anwar” 2012 
interview). Some of the informants told that the youth were often the police men’s 
“main target” when they were in the streets. “They did these things to show us who is 
in control” (“Fadel” 2012 interview), one informant said.  
 
Interestingly, a few of the informants pointed out that there was a generational 
difference regarding the views on this issue. “The older generation didn’t seem to care 
that much about the fact that the authorities and the police took more power”, one 
informant said (“Basel” 2012 interview).  Another informant mentioned that his 
father did not want to take part in the revolution, simply because he had contacts in 
the police department and the traffic department, and therefore “didn’t need things to 
change” (“Sadek” 2012 interview). Convincing people that are normally passive that 
the inequalities of everyday life can be challenged is not simple (Tarrow 2011: 145). 
Moreover, contention is insufficient if individuals adopt a different interpretation of 
what is happening privately, because the challengers must share the injustice frame in 
a public way (Gamson 1992: 73). This example illustrates that there may have been 
lack of collective identity among the people to trigger into collective action around 
this issue any further than the protests that emerged right after Khaled Said’s death. 
Therefore, the difference among the generations may have made it difficult for the 
Egyptian people to have police brutality and oppression as a common theme.  
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5.3.2 Death as a source of collective action 
One of the informants said that the first protest he had ever attended was a protest 
against police brutality in the name of Khaled Said. “This protest made me optimistic 
and I really thought we could make a change. I got arrested, beaten up, and then the 
police released me. But I was happy. Before Khaled Said, I didn’t have hope. I didn’t 
think we could make a change in the country” (“Mokhtar” 2012 interview), he 
stated. Thus, the death of Khaled Said became what Tarrow defines as a “source of 
collective action” (Tarrow 2011: 45) having the power of bringing people together in 
solidarity and grief as something they have in common. Furthermore, funeral 
processions are often the only occasions where protests can begin in a repressive 
system – such as Egypt during the Mubarak regime – where public assemblies are 
banned (ibid.).   
 
Even though there were several protests in both Alexandria and Cairo after the killing 
of Khaled Said, it never escalated to a big revolt before the upheavals in January 2011. 
According to Tarrow (2011: 45), death’s moment is brief, and the ritual occasions in 
relation to the death is soon terminated. Therefore, death is seldom “the source of a 
sustained social movement” (ibid.). This could explain why the protests around the 
death of Khaled Said did not develop into a larger sustained mobilization against the 
authorities.  
 
According to Quattrone and Tversky (1988: 722), “an individual’s attitude toward 
risk depends on whether the outcomes are perceived as gains or losses”.  Although a 
majority of the informants stated that the murder of Khaled Said was directed to them 
as youth, they were still afraid to do something drastic. As one informant said, “Even 
though we hated the police, we were all very afraid of them” (“Sadek” 2012 
interview). Thus, the youth avoided protesting because they believed that chances of 
succeeding through social protest actions were low. Another informant, however, 
claimed that the effect of Khaled Said’s death on the Egyptian youth was similar to 
the impact of the upheavals in Tunisia. The death of Khaled Said made a lot of people 
who had not been interested in politics earlier wake up and pay attention to what was 
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happening to the youth in the society (Ghonim 2012; Khalil 2012): “They started 
thinking that it could be them who got killed next. That was a very strong motivation 
and a turning point” (“Fouad” 2012 interview). Since the death of Khaled Said was 
not directly linked to political issues (Khalil 2012:80-81), it became a case of 
significance for a larger amount of youth. The case of Khaled Said framed a specific 
grievance, namely police brutality and oppression, which made the youth recognize 
that they had a common purpose where the solidarity around Khaled Said’s death 
linked them.  
 
5.3.3 The significance of humiliation  
Several of the informants believed that the excessive use of violence on the 25
th
 and 
28
th
 of January in Tahrir Square made an increasing number of people decide to join 
the protests. One informant said: “We were not afraid anymore, we were very brave” 
(Mahfouz 2012 interview). Another informant told that the police’s use of violence 
towards his friends for demanding their rights made him want to take part in the 
protests. “I decided it was time to act. You cannot watch people be humiliated like 
that for just demanding their rights” (“Sadek” 2012 interview). This illustrates that 
humiliation alone could have been a powerful motivation for a number of Egyptian 
youths to participate in the protests (Haass 2011). Thus, experiencing threats by the 
police that were present in Tahrir Square as well as witnessing what Tarrow refers to 
as “high levels of threat but declining capacity for repression” (Tarrow 2011: 160), 
since some people had passed the fear of protesting, made some of the youth decide to 
join the protests. Suddenly, fighting the regime was no longer exclusively for 
agitators. Rather, it became necessary in order to survive. 
 
According to some of the informants, the case of Khaled Said made people not only 
regard the protests as only politics. Rather, they saw it simply as doing the right thing. 
“You have to choose a side. Either you’re with the people, or you’re with the police. 
When you see injustice and take sides, God will reward you” (“Mokhtar” 2012 
interview), one informant uttered. The incident touched a deep and powerful societal 
nerve, which resonated among ordinary citizens, and thus helped politicize numerous 
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Egyptians who had never before considered attending a protest (Khalil 2012: 81).  
The death of Khaled Said became a “nationwide referendum” (ibid.) on the behavior 
of the police state under the Mubarak regime. As one informant pointed out, 
“Mubarak didn’t have any support from the people, so he got support from guns. 
That’s how he ruled and controlled the people” (“Mokhtar” 2012 interview). To this 
end, the case of Khaled Said may have served as a collective action frame, as it 
helped emphasizing and redefining police brutality as unjust and immoral, which had 
previously been seen as unfortunate but tolerable.  
 
5.3.4 The demand for dignity and a decent life 
Although some of the informants stated that the motivation for participating in the 
protests was not directly linked to the killing of Khaled Said, they emphasized that his 
death became a significant turning point. One of the informants described the life 
under the rule of Mubarak as a life without any rights, opportunities or dignity. For 
her it was the last straw when three young Egyptian men set themselves on fire in 
front of the Parliament Building, two blocks from Tahrir Square, as an expression of 
discontent. “I was so angry! There were no rights for youth. Youth were like shadows 
in the society. All their dreams had vanished. It wasn’t only about Pyramids anymore. 
It was time to react”, she stated (“Fayza” 2012 interview). One of the informants 
explained that the three people had set themselves on fire because they had been 
angry and demanded dignity. These cases of self-immolation, the death of Khaled 
Said and other similar incidents had caused a great anger and frustration among many 
young Egyptians, and made them decide to take to the streets (Atassi 2011; Beydoun 
2011; Traboulsi 2011). “We were gathered around one goal: we wanted change. 
Change of the regime and a change in the society. We demanded decent lives for 
everyone” (“Fayza” 2012 interview).  
 
Several of the informants also expressed a great solidarity with the poor people in 
Egypt, and emphasized that the demand for dignity and a decent life should include 
people from all classes in the society. According to a majority of the informants, it 
was the middle-class who participated during the first days of protest. The working 
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class only decided to participate once they saw it as an opportunity for change 
because they were afraid to lose everything for a change that was not going to happen 
(Henry & Springborg 2011). In this case, the people from the middle-class can be 
regarded as the “early risers”, as they were the first to challenge the authorities in 
Tahrir Square (Khaled 2012: 147; Rahman-Rabbani 2011: 234; Traboulsi 2011:17; 
Shahine 2011). By taking to the streets and protesting, they expanded the opportunity 
for others to join. Furthermore, they put issues on the agenda, such as the downfall of 
the regime, which all the people could relate to (El Mahdi 2012: 144; Khaled 2012; 
144). “When they saw that the people were encouraging everybody to participate, 
they went. They had reached their limits” (“Basel” 2012 interview), one informant 
told. This corresponds with Bayat’s description of “structurally atomized 
individuals”(Bayat 1997: 9) who decided to participate in street demonstrations once 
protests have reached a reasonable degree of legitimacy.  
 
Some of interviewees mentioned that they were fighting for the rights of the poor 
people as much as for themselves. “I felt that I could be strong for these people and 
fight for their rights” (“Sadek” 2012 interview), one informant said. Another 
informant stated: “This was not about myself. I feel that all humans must have their 
rights. That’s when I’m going to relax, when I see all human beings having rights” 
(“Basel” 2012 interview). This weakens my hypothesis that the issues and 
circumstances around the killing of Khaled Said had been a factor motivating the 
Egyptian youth to participate in the protests in Tahrir Square. However, even though 
the case of Khaled Said did not constitute a direct motivation for the young people to 
take part in the protests, it became a focal point for a number of large protests against 
state abuses, and thus a significant turning point.  
 
5.4 Other underlying motivational factors 
Although most of the informants stated that the upheavals in Tunisia motivated them 
to participate in the protests in Tahrir Square, some of them pointed out that there 
were also other factors that had motivated them. A large amount of protesters were 
marching in the streets all across the city, encouraging people that were walking in the 
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sidewalks to join them (Khalil 2012: 144; Bohn 2011: 76; Traboulsi 2011; Beydoun 
2011; Atassi 2011). By chanting “raise your voice, he that shouts won’t die” and 
“Join us, you won’t go to jail”, to people, especially the youth, that were witnessing 
the street protests, the protesters tried to tell them that fear was what kept them from 
changing  (Khalil 2012: 144). Here, the street conveyed “collective sentiments and 
dissent” (Bayat 2011b: 50) expressed by the people who lacked institutional channels 
to express their discontent. Thus, collective action was the only resource they 
possessed to demonstrate their claims against their opponents. Seeing the large 
number of people acting collectively, had a normalizing and legitimizing effect on the 
acts that would otherwise be deemed illegitimate (Bayat 2010: 20).  
 
One informant told that he was at work when he witnessed thousands of people 
walking in the street outside of his work place. “The fact that so many people took to 
the streets at the same time on the 25
th
 of January motivated me a lot. I felt that I had 
to join them. This was the time” (“Mokhtar” 2012 interview). In this way, ordinary 
people recognized that they had a common purpose, and were linked by ties of 
solidarity. The thousands of people that marched in the street towards Tahrir Square 
showed the existence of what Tarrow (2011: 33) defines as “available allies” in the 
population, which made people perceive an opportunity to join the protests. Thus, 
through street politics, ordinary Egyptians found a way to express their views and 
interests (Bayat 2011b: 50). 
 
5.5 Assessment of the findings  
When Mubarak held his speech on February 10, 2011, a generational difference 
became apparent among the protestors in Tahrir Square. While many of the people 
belonging to the older generation were satisfied with his promise not to run for re-
election, the younger generation continued demanding his immediate resignation. In 
this way, there were different attitudes among the people regarding Mubarak as a 
person, but an agreement about the regime. The declining capability for repression by 
the authorities combined with opportunities and threats enhanced the possibility of 
regime change, which made the youth see an opportunity to advance their claims. The 
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disappointment among the youth indicates indirectly that they had hopes of 
witnessing the downfall of both the president and the regime. This reaction illustrates 
that the protests against the political order had been a motivational factor. To this end, 
this finding strengthens the first hypothesis that the Egyptian youth wanted to protest 
against the political, economic and social order, to a certain degree.  
 
Several of the informants stated that they joined the protests to demand rights for all 
people, including the poor. This illustrates that the protest against the political, 
economic and social order was an underlying motivational factor for many of the 
Egyptian youth to join the revolution. The upheavals in Tunisia and the death of 
Khaled Said touched a strong dissatisfaction with their own circumstances of life that 
points to the social conditions of the youth. In this way, the social conditions had now 
been redefined as unjust and immoral, while they previously had been regarded as 
unfortunate yet tolerable. By embedding specific grievances in emotional-laden 
framings, the youth became convinced that their cause was just and important. These 
elements also strengthen the hypothesis to a certain degree.  
 
All of the four females interviewed for this study said explicitly that the social order 
was a factor that motivated them to participate in the protests in Tahrir Square. This 
may indicate that an aspect of the first hypothesis is strengthened. However, none of 
the thirteen male informants mentioned this as a specifically motivating factor.  This 
demonstrates a gender difference between the informants, and therefore modifies this 
aspect of the first hypothesis.  
 
The differences between the generations reflect the hierarchical structures in the 
society, where young people wanted a change in the social order far more than the 
older generation. Also, it illustrates that the people were not as allied as it might seem, 
as people must collectively define their situation as unjust before collective action can 
get underway (McAdam 1999: 51). This indicates that the urge to protest against the 
social order was more an underlying motivational factor rather than a primary 
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motivational factor. Thus, the strength of this hypothesis is modifies, as the findings 
show indications that partly strengthen and partly weaken it. 
 
Tunisia demonstrated the weakness of autocratic regimes, thus making the Egyptian 
youth believe that they could bring about change. By succeeding in claiming the 
downfall of Ben Ali, the Tunisian people showed that the autocratic regimes’ 
repression were more apparent than real. The upheavals in Tunisia became the 
“master frame” (Tarrow 2011:167) of the Egyptian revolution, since the young 
Egyptians could identify with the issues of their neighbor country. 
  
All the youth interviewed for this study very strongly emphasized that the upheavals 
in Tunisia were a crucial motivational factor in their decision to participate in the 
protests. The support the Egyptian youth received from the youth in Tunisia through 
social medias such as Facebook and Twitter, where they were given specific and 
practical advice on how to overthrow the regime, was a motivation in itself. 
Additionally, social media became a tool for exchanging information. Through 
contact via the social media, framing and identity construction was created among the 
youth, which are important elements in creating solidary between the movement 
participants in the two countries. The awakening of the Egyptian youth when 
witnessing the downfall of Ben Ali was crucial, as well as the communication through 
social media. These factors constitute a significant strengthening of the second 
hypothesis, that the Egyptian youth were motivated by the upheavals in Tunisia.   
 
Some of the respondents emphasized that if they had not had access to social media, 
they would have found other ways of communicating in order to mobilize. This was 
proven when the Internet and the telecommunication systems were shut down by the 
regime in an effort to restrain the mobilization among the people. The blocking of the 
Internet increased protest activity. This proves that collective action is activated and 
sustained when people meet face-to-face (Tarrow 2011: 30). Furthermore, it shows 
that “an active network” (Bayat 1997:16) was not needed in order to mobilize, 
because the street itself was transformed into a political arena.  
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The Tunisian revolution sprouted easily in Egypt because the conditions for a revolt 
were already present and deep-rooted in the country. The death of Khaled Said 
became a turning point, as it played an important role in “naming” grievances and 
connecting them to other grievances, and in this way constructed “larger frames of 
meaning” (Tarrow 2011: 144). To this end, his death helped spike the activism and 
unrest that had been growing among the Egyptian youth during the last decade. 
Khaled Said became not only a symbol of police brutality. His death also served to 
illustrate how strongly the youth experienced being passivized and redundant in the 
society, which strengthens the third hypothesis.  
 
One of the informants mentioned that the protest against police brutality in honor of 
Khaled Said was the first time he had protested in public. This may indicate that the 
same has been the case for many other youths. The killing of Khaled Said made the 
youth wake up. Since the case of Khaled Said was not regarded as a direct link to 
political issues, more youth than previously dared to take action and protest.  
However, the protests around the killing of Khaled Said did not evolve into a larger 
mobilization against the authorities. The reason for this might be that death is seldom 
“the source of a sustained social movement” (Tarrow 2011: 45). In this way, the 
hypothesis regarding the youth being motivated by the issues and circumstances 
around the killing of Khaled Said is modified.  
 
One could say that my first hypothesis serves to describe the underlying factors that 
were simmering in the country. The death of Khaled Said awakened the Egyptian 
youth, and became both a turning point and a symbol unifying them. These factors 
came to the surface, and the Egyptian youth dared to take to the street as soon as they 
saw that the Tunisian people had succeeded in overthrowing their authoritarian 
regime. The Tunisian revolution served as a model, both by demanding the downfall 
of the autocratic regime that the Egyptian people identified with, and by 
demonstrating the possible effects of collective action. Thus, my hypothesis number 
two, that the uprising in Tunisia motivated the Egyptian youth, is strengthened.   
 59 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
This study has attempted to answer a key question, namely what were the most 
important motivational factors for the Egyptian youth to participate in the 25
th
 of 
January 2011 revolution? In order to answer this question and to structure my thesis, 
three hypotheses were developed. Firstly, the youth were wanted to protest against the 
political, economic and social order. Secondly, the youth were motivated by the 
upheavals in Tunisia. Thirdly, the youth were motivated by the issues and 
circumstances around the killing of Khaled Said.  
 
6.1 Findings 
The findings of this study show that the three hypotheses neither directly contradict 
nor exclude each other. The study creates an understanding of what should be 
particularly emphasized in each of the hypotheses, and the mutual correlation between 
the different factors.  
 
Regarding the hypotheses specified in the theory chapter, I find only limited support 
for the first hypothesis. Therefore, the strength of the hypothesis about the youth 
wanting to protest against political, economic and social orders is modified. Although 
the Egyptian youth in general and the girls in particular were motivated by the protest 
against the political, economic and social order, the findings from the conducted 
interviews reveal a gender difference in this issue, especially regarding the motivation 
to protest against the social order in the Egyptian society. This hypothesis can, 
however, serve as an illustration of the underlying factors that had been bubbling in 
the society, and not of the Egyptian youth’s main motivation for participating in the 
revolution.  
 
The second hypothesis was that the youth were motivated by the uprising in Tunisia. I 
find substantial support for this hypothesis. Through the Jasmine revolution, the 
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Tunisian people demonstrated that the repression of authoritarian regimes was more 
apparent than real, and that a revolution was possible. Thus, the upheavals in Tunisia 
broke the fear of the Egyptian youth, and made them perceive the probability that 
collective action would lead to success in overthrowing the Mubarak regime. The 
underlying factors bubbling in the country surfaced, and the Egyptian youth dared 
taking to the street as soon as they saw that the Tunisian people had succeeded in 
overthrowing their own authoritarian regime. The Tunisian revolution served as a 
model, both by demanding the downfall of the autocratic regime that the Egyptian 
people identified with, and by demonstrating the likely effects of collective action.  
 
The strength of the third hypothesis regarding the issues and circumstances around 
the killing of Khaled Said is also modified. This factor cannot be considered a main 
motivation for the Egyptian youth to take part in the protests. However, the death of 
Khaled Said became a symbol of police brutality directed against the youth. His death 
became a significant turning point to all my informants, as it “named” grievances and 
connected them to other grievances, and thus constructed larger frames of meaning. 
His death made a large number of Egyptian youths pay attention to police and state 
brutality, because his case was not directly linked to the political issues in the country. 
In this way, it made the youth wake up, as they felt directly insulted by the incident. 
However, the protests around the killing of Khaled Said faded out, and did not 
escalate into a larger mobilization against the authorities.   
 
6.2 Methodological remarks  
When it comes to the methodological criteria of the reliability of a qualitative study, a 
key question is whether another researcher would have come to the same results if the 
study had been carried out at a different time. Bryman (2004:273) argues that it is 
impossible to “freeze” the social settings and circumstances of a study so that they 
can be reproduced. Nevertheless, the goal is to minimize errors and biases (Yin 2003: 
37).  
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A potential problem concerning the reliability issue is the use of semi-structured 
interviews as data collection for this study. This may have made reliability more 
problematic, because coding and interpreting the obtained information from such 
interviews is challenging. I have done my best to keep this in mind. Furthermore, I 
have been aware of the possibility of systemic bias when assessing my interview data. 
Thus, some comments have to be made on the generalization of the results of the 
study. Firstly, as all the informants were higher educated youth from the middle-class, 
the findings cannot be generalized on youth as a group. The answers could have 
varied if I in my interviews also had included youth from the working-class. Secondly, 
as the interviews were carried out in English, the informants could not express 
themselves in their native language, which can have influenced the answers. In order 
to reduce the possibility of systematic bias in my study, I have used relevant 
secondary literature and other sources to raise the level of reliability, as recommended 
by Yin (2003: 99). 
 
In this thesis, I have attempted to contribute to an understanding of why people 
participate in social movements. Although there exists a considerable amount of 
literature on this subject, there has been limited focus on youth as a category in social 
movement debates (Bayat 2010: 116), as well as the study of youth as political actors 
(Bayat 2011a).  
 
However, a much broader category of data would be needed for carrying out a 
thorough analysis of why youth participate in social movements. One of the 
challenges in conducting this study has been the lack of empirical studies responding 
directly to my research question. Some general considerations have been made, as 
there has been only a limited amount of literature in support of these results.   
 
A broad angle was chosen in response to the research question, and thus three 
different hypotheses were presented as possible explanations. However, the indicators 
given for the three hypotheses have not been measured in detail, as the extent of this 
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study has been limited. Nevertheless, my intention has first and foremost been to shed 
light on a research question that is still largely unexplored.  
 
6.3 Implications 
Since the end of the protests in 2011, an increasing amount of literature on the 
Egyptian revolution has been published. This shows that researchers have taken great 
interest in the subject. However, so far the perspective has mainly been on the people 
as a whole, rather than focusing on specific groups in the society. Not only would it 
be interesting to focus more on youth as a category, but also on the differences within 
this group. In addition, it would have been interesting to study the deprived youth and 
their life situation. Furthermore, more research should be done on the gender aspect, 
as it would help to explain the differences between young women and men in their 
stance to both the revolution and social challenges in the Egyptian society.  Moreover, 
it would have been interesting to question the same youths who were interviewed for 
this thesis about what they think was achieved in the Egyptian society after the 
upheavals, as well as what effect youth can have on the future of their country.   
 
If the youth continue to be excluded and thus stand in the shadow of the society, it 
will become highly problematic for Egypt. For this reason the Egyptian society ought 
to include the youth in the public debate and show that they are trusted by giving 
them responsibilities. In order for civic engagement to grow and for individual and 
community values to be focused upon, participatory mechanisms should be developed. 
In this way youth would have a greater say in the planning and implementation of 
matters that will impact their lives, especially on political platforms. For the future of 
Egypt, it is crucial that not only the government, but also families, learning 
institutions, political parties and religious institutions give young people increasing 
attention and influence.  
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Appendix 1: List of Interviews 
 
Area specialists 
Barsalou, Judy; Visiting scholar at the American University in Cairo. Previously in 
charge of the Ford Foundation office in Cairo until 2011. Personal interview, 11 
September 2012.  
Hakim, Randa; Communication and Media Adviser at the Royal Norwegian Embassy 
in Cairo. Personal interview, 25 September 2012.  
 
Youth informants 
“Abdelrahman” (19); Senior student in Marketing. E-mail interview 8 October 2012. 
“Anwar” (27); Director of short movies and commercials, Personal interview, 27 
September 2012. 
Asmaa Mahfouz (27); Business and Administration Graduate from Cairo. Has five 
years experience in Sales and Market Administration, and is currently searching for a 
new job. Personal interview, 7 September 2012. 
“Basel” (25); Communication Graduate from Cairo. Personal interview, 6 September 
2012. 
“Fadel”(27); Law Graduate. Personal interview, 26 September 2012. 
“Fayza” (30); Media writer for a TV show. Personal interview, 8 September 2012. 
“Fouad” (23); Student. Personal interview, 20 September 2012. 
“Hazem” (29); Assistant director, work freelance. Personal interview, 15 September 
2012. 
“Ismael” (25); Pharmacist. Currently works as a casting director, and as a part-time 
actor. Personal interview, 5 September 2012. 
“Khaled”(29); freelance photographer, Personal Interview, 24 September 2012.  
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“Mourad” (24); Student. Personal interview, 20 September 2012. 
“Mokhtar” (23); Civil engineer. Personal Interview, 20 September 2012. 
“Noura” (24); Unemployed, studied photography, experience from working in a call 
center. Personal interview 8 September 2012. 
 “Sadek” (23); Student, study food science and food processing technology. Personal 
interview 3 September 2012. 
“Sayid”(22); Student, currently lives in India. Skype interview, 6 October 2012. 
“Tarek” (22); Art student, part-time photographer. Personal Interview, 23 September 
2012. 
“Sonya” (22); Assistant director, currently unemployed. Personal interview, 19 
September 2012.   
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Appendix 2: Interview guide 
 
1.0 Background information 
1.1 How old are you? 
1.2 What is your study or occupation? 
1.3 What is your civil status? 
1.4 What is your religion? 
1.5 What was your living situation before the fall of Mubarak’s Regime? 
1.6 What was your working situation before the fall of Mubarak’s Regime? 
 
2.0 The role of the family 
2.1 What did your family think about your participation in the Tahrir Square? 
2.2 Were they supportive?  
(If yes) In what way?  
(If no) What were their reasons for not being supportive? 
2.3 Did they take part in the demonstrations? If yes, how?  
2.4 Did any of your female family participants take part in the demonstrations? If yes, 
did you feel that you take care of them/look after them? 
2.5 Were there some divisions in the family? 
2.6 What did your parents think about your participation in the revolution? 
2.7 Does anybody in your family have any previous history in participating in 
demonstrations or organizations? 
2.8 Were there any members in your family who didn’t approve of you being in the 
Tahrir Square? 
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3.0 Generational conflict 
3.1 How do you understand the difference between the generations in Egypt? 
3.2 Did you notice a difference between the older and the younger Egyptians who 
took part in the protests in Tahrir Square, and if so, in what way? 
3.3 Do you think there was a big difference in the goals of the youth and the goals of 
the elders in Tahrir Square? 
 
4.0 Level of activity 
4.1 In what way were you active in the demonstration in Tahrir Square? 
4.2 Was this the first time you participated in a demonstration?  
(If yes) What made you participate now? 
(If no) Can you tell me about your previous experiences? 
4.3 Do you belong to a specific group or organization?  
(If yes) Which group and why?  
(If no) Is there a certain reason for that? 
 
5.0 Ideals and visions 
5.1 Where did you get your inspiration and motivation from when you decided to take 
part in the demonstrations in Tahrir Square? 
5.2 What role do you think the upheavals in Tunisia played for the Egyptian youth 
before the demonstrations in Tahrir Square? 
5.3 What kind of a society did you envision when you decided to demonstrate for 
change? 
5.4 What changes were you hoping to see in the society? 
5.5 What changes were you hoping that the demonstrations would lead to? 
5.6 What kind of future visions do you have for yourself and your country? 
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6.0 Youth and rights 
6.1 Can you tell me about your thoughts around the rights of youth (between 16 and 
30) in Egypt before the fall of the Mubarak regime? 
6.2 How do you feel that the role and importance of youth in the Egyptian society was 
before the revolution? 
6.3 Do you think it was easy for youth to get a job, gain respect in the Egyptian 
society during the Mubarak regime? 
(If yes) What do you think is the reason for that?  
(If no) Why not? 
6.4 How do you feel that the role and importance of youth in the Egyptian society is 
after the fall of the Mubarak regime? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
